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WESTERN EUROPE AN) THE UN-
TRENDS AND PROSPECTS
INTRODUCTION
This collection of brief essays, written in connection with the United
Nations Project at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, grows out of a suggestion originally made to the author
when he was associated with the Department of State, It was suggested that
appraisals of the future utility and prospects of the UN might benefit from
a privately-made estimate of the climate in a few key Western European states
whose approach to the UN seemed from a distance to vary in significant ways
from that of the United States, particularly as a consequence of the Suez
and Hungarian crises of 1956,
The present study was prepared following a brief visit to Western
Europe in the summer of 1958 by the writer in his capacity as Director of
the UN Projecto In the course of this trip intensive discussions were held
with a number of individuals chosen for their capacity to illuminate the
general tone of policy and planning in six Western European countries, Those
conferred with included senior officials in the governments, certain key
personalities in political life, such as party leaders and members of parlia-
ments, and a number of leading journalists, publicists, and scholars0  The
purpose was to lay a basis for attempting to understand the present trends and
discernible prospects bearing on possible uses of the UN as an instrument of
free world policy in the period ahead.
As a sampling of opinion, the views reported herein are clearly in the
category of "elite" rather than popular. They are presented here not in the
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form of "field report" but as a series of essays drawing on information and
impressions received during the trip against a background of general foreign
policy and performance, particularly in the UN aetting, Above all, it is
significant that these people were interviewed, not in the diplomatically
exotic and politically unique setting of United Nations headquarters in New
York, but in their native habitats, so to speak, where perspectives grow out
of the national setting and above all out of the ineluctable realities of
domestic politicsE y design, a majority of those interviewed were no "U xpr
Others have explored the public behavior of some of these nations in
the UN, and the detailed record is available for those to whom it Is of
primary interest, The hope in the present endeavor is to try to capture a
glimpse of the spirit of policy and planning regarding the UN against as
wide a political backdrop as possible, and from this to deduce trends and
tendencies if they could be descried, Such an "overview" must necessarily
be both unscholarly and incomplete. Its value can lie only in such intuitions
as it evokes and in the linking of political insights which might otherwise
remain isolated,
It is convenient but not wholly accurate to entitle this study "Western
Europe." The area covered is, more precisely, "Little Europe" or "The Six"
2
or "The European Community", plus the United Kingdom This grouping of eeven,
now joined in the Western European Union, has an explicit territorial, poli=
tical, and economic significance, and the only difficulty is in choosing a
meaningful label for ito The one we have chosen is "Western Europe,"
1. Aside from the documentation of the UN itself, studies of national UN
policies and performance, generally up to 1955, of Britain, Belgium, Italy,
and West Germany are or will be available in the series of National Studies
on International Organization currently in process of publication by the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York.
2 Luxembourg has been oiJtted from the present study
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Tberia--Spain and Portugal--constitutes a different tradition and politically
is a separate story, Austria is technically neutral, Switzerland is trad-
itionally neutral, Ireland has demonstrated its independence of any regional
generalities since its admission to the UN in 1955, urging upon the 1957
General Assembly session a distinctly "non-NATO" proposal for disengagement
and voting, against the West, both in 1957 and 1958, in favor of discussing
the matter of Chinese representation,
The papers which follow are thus designed to speak for themselves and
only for themselves, For that matter, one of the beliefs confirmed by this
inquiry is that generalizations about even the limited area dealt with are
made only at the risk of obscuring important political truths,, A distinguished
French diplomat who wrote on the same subject in 1948 did speak in such generic
terms, He said:
For a European, the United Nations is principally a
means of preserving peace- 0 For a European the United
Nations is principally considered in relation to the idea
of security, which constitutes his primary concern, The
failure of the experiment of the League of Nations, in
which Europe at one time placed its hopes, has left the
European skeptical of international organizations. o The
European believes that a large part of the activities of
the United Nations must be concerned with European pro-
blems not only in the interest of Europe, but in the
interest of world peace0 3
The reference to the League of Nations is still a valid one, in the sense
that Europe--Western Europe-was the chief protagonist in the League but today
is only one of many players in the drama of the United Nations, If countries
rate the UN in terms of their own relative importance in its scheme of things,
it was inevitable that the UN should have been downgraded alongside the Euro-
pean memories of the League; this psychology persists as a specific element in,
for example, the French view of the UN,
3, Jacques Fouques-Duparc, 1A European Point of View on the United Nations,"
International Conciliation, No, 443, September 1948, pp, 4534h
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But history has overtaken M. Fouques-Duparcia estimate in other ways,
The countries of Western Europe in this age evaluate the UN above all according
to the way they themselves diagnose the great convulsions that are taking
place in the underdeveloped and anticolonial areas of the world whose problems
and interests have increasingly come to dominate the proceedings of the world
organization.. This being so, the appraisals of the UN in the six countries
under discussion range along a spectrum which is graded according to the
shion in which each country perceives the whole ensemble of tensions that
characterize European-Afro Asian relationships, By this method France and
Belgium and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom are located along one end
of the scale, At its extreme, the view of the UN here is one of stern criticism
which tends to comprehend not only specific grievances but also the whole organi-
zation and its works, The country concerned is felt to be the victim of the
UNgs fifteen year trend toward doctrinaire anticolonialism and Afro-Asian
ascendency and specifically, in the case of France and Britain, victim of the
specific injustices and stupidities visited on their policies by the UN--and,
let it never be forgotten, the USo--in the Suez crisis of late 1956.
No single country, not even France, which entertains this view to a re-
markable degree, exactly fits this stereotype, Aspects of it have of course
been visible in New York since 1945 and increasingly with the passage of time.
It is of greater interest that on their home grounds the countries that partake
to a significant extent in this view tend to exclude the UN from a pince of any
real significance in their forward planning--planning not only with respect
to future relations with the underdeveloped countries, but also planning with
respect to other uses of the UN such as its para-military potentialities in
situations of limited hostilities, particularly where Uie great powers need
to be excluded if peace and security are to be restored,,
At the other end of the scaleg in striking contrast, are West Germany and
Italy, which have become noncolonial powers and are finding their new status
to be profitable both politically and economically. With only a slightly
imaginative effort, one can see the Netherlands--once freed of the diplomatic
..ncubus of Jest New Guinea-in an equivalent posture of at least open-mindedneas
to new possibilities in the UN that might be of value to present and future
rational and free world interests, AA a phenomenon of political changethe
transition of European powers from "colonial" to "noncolonial" needs more
study than it has had. To one observer it is as though emancipation from
the category of "colonial power" had removed a species of political scales
from the iyse of a nation as it looks afresh at its future relationships with
the underdeveloped and anticolonial countries of the non-European world, By
contrast with France and Belgium, imagination is given relatively uninhibited
play at this end of the spectrum as at least some responsible national leaders
and planners consider how the UN might be used to further Europe s relationships
with the world of Asia and Africa and Latin America, as well as how it might
play a more effective role in the unending propaganda battle between East and
West.,
England, while still playing out her ancient role as a colonial power,
at the same time possesses certain political qualities which might i)rk toward
greater future flexibility and accommodation in making use of the UN than is
apparent today, Perhaps the most interesting case~as suggested, is the Nether=
lands, which is in transition,, Many of her thoughtful leaders are now looking
beyond the limits of the present to the day when West New Guinea will no longer
be a centerpiece of Dutch activity in the UN,. With important domestic consider-
ations helping to shift the balance, it is almost predictable that Halland will
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venture beyond her allies in the search for a new role for the UN that Is
responsive to political and economic requirements of the world she has seen
changed so drastically since World War IL
This image is easily overdrawn,, The UN is not a major factor in the
foreign policy schemes of any of the Western European countries except at
roments of acute criais, such as 3uez in 1956 and Lebanon in 1958, or except
with respect to a particular interest that at a given time may assume important
national proportions, such as the issue of Indonesia for the Netherlands or,
perhaps in the near future, Berlin and reunification for the Germans,. But the
UN is not a self-starting mechanism, Output is intimately related to input,
Much may depend on the extent to which these states, rich in diplomatic energy
and political inventiveness, come to see uses for the UN which bear on their
emerging interests, Compared with the essentially defensive role these countries
have traditionally played in the UN, a role of positive and creative leadership
could yield very different political consequences for both the world organisa-
tion and the Western alliance,
A few other generalizations can be ventured, Certainly one is safe in
saying that throughout Western Europe the UN seems distant, even remote, from
the average person. Paradoxically, in nonmember Germany the local UN associa-
tions are probably more vigorous than i: the five other states which are members,
Such private organizations are less active in Italy and the United Kingdom,
dormant in France, and nonexistent in Belgium
It can also be generalized that American policy toward Communist China,
specifically regarding its seating in the UN, is opposed by virtually all shades
Of political opinion in these countries, The concession which our closest allies
annually make to American opinion in the vote to postpone discussion of this
matter in the General Assembly 1s a wasting asset the overLall political cost
Of h is icreasng
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A final generalisation rests on somewhat less firm ground., The
UN is a significantly partisan issue only in Britain, Yet elsewhere as well
as in Britain it receives its most vocal support from the opposition parties,
usually Socialist, and from the intelligentsia; conversely, the most vocal
criticism comes from the political right. In all of these countries the
government is, at least nominally, conservative, but does not
always reflect with fidelity the sharply critical view of the UN found on the
extreme right, This political phenomenon can be explained in a number of ways,
For one thing, the government is required to govern, which usually serves to
exclude rather automatically the extravagances of extremism, For another,
the civil servants who carry on the day-to-day formulation and execution of
policy tend to adopt a more pragmatic and realistic view of their problems which,
while it often seems to exclude the capacity for imaginative long-range planning,
does usually come to sensible terms with the operative situation, whether in the
UN or elsewhere,.
The other side of the coin is that the out-of-office advocates of greater
uses of the UN are vulnerable to the process of transformation which often
changes the reformer into a steward of the status quo once he finds himself en-
trusted with political responsibility, The Socialist parties of Western Europe
command an estimated 100 million voteso Their leaders speak today in terms of
more imaginative and constructive uses of the UN, specifically in building
bridges between Europe and the world to the South. But only their accession
to political power would demonstrate whether other national interests which
to many of their compatriots define the UN in terms of hirrance and obstacle,
if not as an enemy, remain overriding0  Further changes in the colonial rela.
tionships could of course end in eliminating one vital sector of
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of the European problem in the UN; but its legacy will however persist in
residual tensions between Europe and the Afro-Asian nations, and it has yet
to be shown whether doctrinaire "internationalism" can transform these rela.
tionships, in or out of the UN, any more successfully than it was able to do
under the postwar Labor regime in Britain,
The Suez episode, discussed here with respect to each of the six countries,
did not alter leadership attitudes in England and France so much as it crystal-
lized the growing sense of betrayal by the UN (and the US) in surrendering the
fundamental Western position to Arab-Asian nationalism, As suggested in the
first essay, the British perhaps learned a lesson from the Suez fiasco that is
still in process of being digested, The French, however, appear to wish only
to satisfy themselves that others have now come to appreciate the rightness
of the unsuccessful French attempt to stem the tide of Arab nationalism,
At the other end of the spectrum Italy and West Germany profoundly
deplored the British-French action as setting back tragically a process of
developing new-style relationships for which each of those countries today
sees itself as a principal agent. Certainly in Western Europe as a whole the
military and diplomatic disaster of Suez inspired many with a new sense of
importance and indeed urgency on behalf of creation of a true European community,
And in the militarily indefensible and politically modest Netherlands and Belgium
(although not yet in the France which is at the moment seeking rather single-
mindedly to reestablish her self-image of grandeur) there is an explicit acknowledg=
ment that to be part of a strong and united Europe is also to reestablish the
balance in the UN vis-h-vis the Afro-Asian bloc (as well, it might be added, as
the balance in NATO vis-a-vis the United States).
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There is no attempt here to summarise all of what follows. The reader
will be able to draw his own conclusions from this report, He will learn
that opinion is far from unanimous, that beneath attitudes of certainty and
self-righteousness there may reside obscure feelings of frustration, of humilia-
tion, even of guilt. He will see images of Hitler and Munich transferred to
Middle East nationalism with the inevitable result of a certain amount of poli-
tical and spiritual confusion. One is tempted to borrow the words of Matthew
Arnold in epitomizing "colonial" Europe 's current role in relation to the UN:
"Wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be borno"
Certainly there is an overgrowth of bitterness and of political anachronism
that seems to stifle the kind of creative impulses which are now flowing into
the movement for European unityo
Still, beneath the surface there are some symptoms of a longer vision,
perhaps as part of the larger European framework, which must in time come to
terms with the new political world that history, even now changing the face
of Europe, is in process of creating out of the old. There are dangers, The
pace will be different for each country, and the virus of nationalism may re-
infect once again its ancestral European host0 If the Arab world, in the words
of Nasser, represents a role in search of a hero, France looks to some like a
hero in search of a role, and Italy and Germany could once again come to know
that process,
The capacity of Europe to make effective use of the UN in the years ahead
is a function of the UN9s capacity to advance what Europe conceives to be its
interestso In the final analysis of course Europe's interests can only be
interpreted by Europeans, But at the same time the position of the United States
is central to the whole process, The American role in the UN has in part been
xdefined b5y the defensive postre of its Aropean allies on colonial issues,
Cur task has been conceived, correctly in the author's estimation, as one
of seeking to moderate the pace and tempo of the non-Western revolution
which we hitherto have seen as being played out against the backdrop of a
relatively static Europe, Both the American and the European roles may be
changing., Our UN policies and stances have often appeared to the Europeans
as basically unsympathetic to their t but icithout eliciting the
political profit from the non-European world which our policies presumably
ieserved, New stresses and strains as between ourselves and our Western
.uropean allies in the UN will almost predictably arise when the moratorium
inds on the Chinese representation question, doubtless soon after a Labor
rovernment attains power in Britain,
In any event, the immediate future holds promise only of transition
rnd of fresh definition of European interests in the light of unfolding
ealitiese For these several reasons it is doubly important that European
Solicy once again acquire confidence in the stability and vigor of American
eadership, both within the Western coalition and in the UN, Europe,9 even
hile recovering its sense of identity and inventing new forms of political
ction, will require in the period ahead far more of an American effort to
nderstand, to look ahead, and to lead.
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THE CONTEMPORARY BRITISH VIE OF THE UN
Introduction
Five days after the Durbar ton Oaks conversations were concluded in
Washington in the fall of 1944, the following observation was made by Great
Britain's foremost newspaper:
The mere exisience of a quarrel, or of the griev-
ance of some small State against a mighty neighbor,
will concern the Council only in the unlikely event
of peace appearing in peril. The organization will
exist rather for security as such than for justice
as such, and will, it seems, leave less dyubt on
this point than did its Geneva precursor.
British wartime expectations &bout the UN tended to place considerably
more emphasis on security than on justice, perhaps because experience had
made Englishmen skeptical about such thorny abstractions as international
"justice* compared with their more ingenuous cousins across the sea who were
to. write this notion into the Charter at San Francisco the following year.
. Expectations as to security were of course to be dashed on both sides
of the Atlantic as the Cold War came to block Western hopes for a new inter-
national order of stability and peace-keeping machinery. But for the British
the kind of UN that did in fact substitute for their hopes was especially
unsatisfactory. The real-life UN seemed to them to represent a forum dedi-
cated to hasty and ill-advised alterations in relations between the West and
the world of former and present Western dependencies in Asia, Africa, and
the Middle East. This trend went far during the first eleven years to con-
firm earlier British misgivings toward an organization in which those
1. London Times, October 12, 1944.
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relationships, and in particular British colonial rule, were to be subjected
to what seemed to them fundamentally irresponsible and unconstructive public
criticism.2
This fact should be taken in conjunction with another one even more
basic to an understanding of Britain's attitude toward the UN. Unlike any
other country of Western Europe, in England the UN is a serious domestic
party issue. This assertion is tempered by yet a third fundamental fact.
The British public-except at moments of genuine crisis--can only be des-
cribed as bored by the UN. Yet this popular indifference serves to encourage
the attitudinizing on the UN issue that has become characteristic of partisan
discussions. The partisan cleavage in its present form did not begin with
Suez; but Suez was the event which posed the issues on a wide national basis.
What underlies this curious situation, and what is its meaning for the
future of the UN? Let us consider first the larger context in which British-
UN relations acquire meaning.
Britain, the UN, and Histor
The British outlook, so far as the UN is concerned, is a function both
of the British past and the British future. Britain today is at a critical
junction point between the two. New directions for British policy are be-
coming visible, but the vision is obscured, as in all history, by the con-
tinuing momentum of what has gone before. In her rosponses to the changing
world Britain today finds herself circumscribed by her past but mindful of
2. For an excellent study of British expectations about the UN, and British
policy through 1955, see Britain and the United Nations, prepared by the
Royal Institute of International Affairs for the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1957).
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a newer order of things. Her imperial role is all but gone, her strategic
brotherhood with America is still strong but shaken, and her internal order-
especially the collection of traditional ways and institutions lumped under
the label of The Establishment-is undergoing relentless alteration, She is
already exploring some of the newer pathways, collaborating with yesterday's
colonies within an unrecognizably new Commonwealth, moving toward hitherto
unacceptable economic ties with the European continent, and reversing one
hundred and eighty-two years of history by declaring with every new dto
tion on Christmas Island her independence of the United States,
All of these elements have a profound bearing on Britain~s relations
with the UN, The categories of the past have up to now made the UN, for
Britain, a place where Europe collided with the anticolonial world in a
losing battle, the cruelest feature of which was the sense of American pres-
sure that ruled out any real chance of holding fast against the tide, So
long as the American alliance was the cornerstone of British security-= *es it
still is-.and Europe and the Commonwealth the prime foci of British political
strength-as they still are--the UN has had little to offer Britain of posi-
tive interest. The Churchillian vision of world unity built upon the pillars
of effective regional association, all under the stately direction of the
Great Powers, has yielded to the various realities of the postwar world, no
single one of which could be defined as consonant with the traditional Britis
vision of the world and her place in it.
Britain has thus been torn between the agony of a defensive retreat
from her old colonial areas and the preoccupying network of new relations
with the Commonwealth, the US, and Europe, But even this last *se of issues
impinged on the UN picture at many po.nts0 For example, rlatio i
India require acute attention to. the UN setting which India and its fellows
find as congenial for their purposes as Britain finds it often uncongenial
Britain"s estimate of the UN has more and more reflected an unsureness
about the directions in which she is actually moving, This is often con-
cealed from the naked eye because British policies in the UN, like those
of the United States, have tended to reflect the older strategies while time
and events could do their work of eventual modernization.
The "Basic" British View of the UN
Winston Churchill was speaking for many of his fellow countrymenhe
nine months after Suez, he said, "It is certain that if the JUN Genera7
Assembly continues to take its decisions on grounds of enmity, opportunis-m
or merely jealousy and petulance, the whole structure may be brought to
nothingo" 3  His loyal wartime "Prof," now Viscount Cherwell, said it with
even more vehemence:
Lfhe General Assembly gives] every nation or pseudo-
nation an equal vote., and this, of course, is perz-
fectly ludicrous,,.The most civilized nations are
equated with tiny states, many of whose inhabitants
are fetichists who cannot even read or write,
At the other extreme Hugh Gaitskell, in his Godkin Lectures at Harvard
shortly after Suez, said on this very point that recommendations of the
General Assembly carry powerful moral obligations for all nations "provided
these are taken by really large majorities.," Such numerical majorities a.re
of course the very features of the U4 scene which British critics of the P
3, Speech to American Bar Association dinner, London, July 31, 19S57 cV
York Times, August 1, 1957,
h Speech in House of Lords, quoted by Arthur Krock in Nei, Io -zi
April 23, 1957,
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most deplore as meaningless and often downright harmful. With the British
landings still in the headlines, Mr. Gaitskell asserted in the same lecture
that force is illegal, even as a last resort, if it is not in actual defense
against armed attack. 5
It is instructive that about five weeks before the Suez attack Foreign
Secretary Selwyn Lloyd., in addressing the UN General Assembly, described the
reality of the UN with a balance that is Qnly now returning to English poli-
tical comment:
But so far as the United Nations in its present
state of development is concerned, it is unfair
to blame it as an institution for its shortcomings.
Any blame there may be must be attributed to the
member states who collectively constitute the
strength or the weakness of the United Nations.
At the same time, Mr. Lloyd epitomized the keen British sense of injus-
tice about the UN which was to be actually expertenced only a month later
when Hungary and Suez became politically juxtaposed:
And, above all, if there grows up the belief that
the Assembly has two standards, one for the law-
abiding, one for those who are influenced by its
views, and another standard less stringent for
those who treat it with indifference, the Assemgly
will never build up its authority in the world.
Selwyn Lloyd on the eve of Suez was perhaps more representative of the
overall British view of the UN than were the spokesmen for the two parties
after Suez. This conclusion is supported by interviews held with leading
government and non-governmental figures, on the basis of which it is possible
to sketch out several composite sets of beliefs and attitudes toward the UN
5. Hugh Gaitskell, The Challeng of Coexistence (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 19577T. 13.
6. New York Times, September 25, 1957.
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which could be said to represent elite opinion in Britain toward the UN.
These may possibly offer clues to responsible British attitudes toward the
UN which may be expected in the period immediately ahead. The composites
are three: first, a basic British attitude, and second and thirdly, conser-
vative and liberal-socialist attitudes.
The first, overall, composite draws on present governmental thinking,
moderate Conservative party opinion, and an important segment of Labor party
opinion. It would not comprehend the detailed views of party ideologues such
as Gaitskell or Hailsham, or of isolated intellectual circles, or of dedi-
cated professionals in the UN field; but even among these some of the funda-
mental attitudes are shared.
The overall composite confirms what modern British history surely
suggests: that the basic British approach toward the UN is above all prag-
matic, not theoretical or abstract or idealistic. "Does the UN appear to be
serving British interest well or badly?" is the prime question. The US of
course has occasion to ask itself the same question with respect to American
interests. But by contrast to the rather less sentimental British frame of
mind, American policy toward the UN is seen by the British as doctrinaire
and slogan-ridden. (This difference was once summed up by the English
anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer when he observed that the US approaches insti-
tutions as though they were machines, to be developed through tinkering and
the application of the laws of mechanics. The British view institutions as
though they were trees: works of nature whose growth is organic, to be
brought along only by judicious watering, pruning, and, above all, patience.7 )
7. See The American People, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1948), pp. 151-152.
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Along with its pragmatlc fttrAm of mio, a strong strain of isolationism
persists in the British outlook (strong enough to have produced after the
Dunkirk evacuation and the fall of France the perverse reaction of "Thank
God now we can get on with it ourselves.") Against the background of modern
British diplomatic history, this isolationist strain produces a nostalgia
not only for remembered British greatness but also for the remembered caps-
city to play an independent role of "balancer" in the international con-
figuration of power, And indeed a realistic understanding of the role of
power in world politics strongly conditions Britain's skepticism about the
increasing role of the UN General Assembly, sustains her attachment to great
power (as opposed to parliamentary) diplomacy, and magnifies her sense of
frustration in the face of declining ability to act independently of America
and of Europe,
Seen this way, the limitatifns within which Britain must tailor her
policies to those of her allies, limitations exemplified by the UN and
indeed by the whole network of mutual relationships with the US and Western
Europe, represent an obscure form of humiliation forced upon Britain by her
desperate need for economic viability and by her inability to meet the
material requirements for successfully applying military power in the con-
temporary world,,
Within this general framework British leadership displays three major
characteristicst a grudging acceptance of the UN not only as a politicIl
necessity but also, at least in its origins, a profound concession to the
idealistic Americans; a nostalgia for a more independent role, creating a
frame of mind which both subconsciously and, on occasion, explicitly resents
a coequal role for those only recently portrayed as "lesser breeds without
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the law"; and perhaps most segnificant -in the actual day-to-day operations
of international society, a deep-seated conviction that Britain is profoundly-
right in her basic foreign policy attitudes, and that consequently the most
important if not the only function of the UN is to "educate" others about
the rightness of the British course. If this complex of attitudes can be
summarized, perhaps it would add up to agreement with the aphorism of Lord
Palmerston one hundred and ten years ago that Ehgland has no perpetual
friends and no natural enemies, but eternal interests.
It is here that the picture needs to be differentiated. For although
perhaps all shades of opinion in the center of the "leadership" spectrum
share to some degree the latter point of view, its relevance to the range
of problems commonly denominated "colonial" requires that more detailed
distinctions be made.
View from the Right
In the right hand side of the spectrum, perhaps unanimously in the
high ranks of the civil service, even among those who will permit themselves
words like "lunacy" and "schizophrenic" when speaking of Sir Anthony Eden
at the time of Suez, one finds the most articulately expressed attitude of
complete certainty in the rectitude of British colonial policy, and equal
certainty that its critics are ignorant, misguided, or even vicious.8  The
8. As the Marquess of Salisbury recently stated it in print, "...to most
Englishmen, the record of Britain in the colonial field during the last
century ranks as one of great achievement; and their only doubt is not
whether the pace of constitutional advance has been too slow, but whether
it has not been too fast; whether these peoples have yet quite grown up;
whether they are really ready for independence; and whether, for them,
independence may not mean the end of liberty." Foreign Affairs, April
1958, Vol. 36, No. 3, p. 405.
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supreme confidence behind this conviction produces what might be called a
"reform school" theory of the UN, in which the latter is seen above all as
a means of edifying others as to what Britain considers right and proper in
the realm of colonial policy. Put another way, it is the theory the UN is
useful only to the extent that it enables the United Kingdom to convince
others of the correctness of her case and the need to support it. The emo-
tional intensity of high Government officials in justifying British overseas
rule on grounds of moral philosophy--the goal of freedom for the individual,
but not necessarily for the "state"--is matched only by their irritation with
those who may not view it in the same light and who therefore require "educa-
tion." The British task, in this view, is to get its ideas across primarily
to its allies but also to others. Thus, where criticism continues to out-
weigh approbation, as with colonial issues in the UN setting, that organiza
tion loses its value as a prime instrument of policy for Britain.
Of those conferred with, only one administrator of a British trust
territory admitted to finding any positive value in the UN' s operational
concern for dependent territories. This value, albeit grudgingly expressed,
was in terms of "keeping the administering authority up to the mark" through
having to submit periodic progress reports to the UN. This official added
that UN visiting missions to trust territories have been useful educational
experiences for, e.g., Indian members, giving the latter an opportunity to
see the problems at first hand, the consequence of which is sometimes to
moderate their otherwise abstract polemics. But on balance, even this offi-
cial could see no contribution to the welfare of the territory itself either
by the UN or indeed by the whole apparatus of international concern.
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This is not too different from the asserti-ns ay other government offi-
cials that the UN is a purely negative force in colonial affairs, having the
dubious value of educating the anti-colonial nations as to the nature of
responsibility and reality. The interesting thing is that precisely the
same statement was privately made by a former member of the Labor shadow
cabinet.9
The Conservative party, recognizing that the British public while per-
haps bored with the UN is possibly somewhat better disposed toward it than
the immediate post-Suez reaction indicated, tempers its criticism by assert-
ing the desire to make the UN work as an effective instrument for carrying
out (British) foreign policy. At the moment, the UN is seen almost unani-
mously in conservative circles as a "hindrance" to British policy. Nonethe-
less, the UK must use it as best it can. Since the UN is a failure when it
comes to protecting British security interests--Foreign Office officials in
private conversations state flatly that "no account" is taken of the UN in
considering British security interests--one might look for major British
efforts to strengthen and improve the organization toward this end. On the
contrary, there appears no likelihood of a British move in this direction
from the Tory side, perhaps because the latter's somewhat emotional sense of
political estrangement from the UN is fortified by a realistic awareness of
the difficulties of strengthening the UN in the ways it favors. The diffi-
culty of initiating reforms in the security field are underscored by the
9. The theory of the UN as an "inciter to riot" in colonial areas, a theory
advanced by, inter alia, South African and Belgian publicists, is at least
in part apparently shared by the group which prepared Britain and the
United Nations, o2. cit., see p. 267.
change in postwar power reLatluns wis, a pointed out elsewnere, make modern
Britain a "consumer" rather than a "producer" of security 0
Responsible Conservatives now say that outright hostility to the UN is to
be found only in fringe groups in the right wing of British politics, and cer-
tainly such hostility is not generally typical of governmental thinking" One
of the leaders of the Conservative pa'ty privately counts only 12 "die-hard
Suez men" in the House of Commons, and insists that the UN is not really a party
issue, At the same timue, ever since Suez it has been extraordinarily difficualt
to take one example, to secure Conservative signatures on petitions n pl
letters in favor of the UN, The only readily available Conservati ve
wishers tend to be considered "dissidents" by party regulars, As om r'y poli-
tician put it, the anti-UN wound of Suez has temporarily healed, but i t could
reopen at any time, Still, the 1en tradition of international confc
diplomiacy remains strong, despite its authorls aberrations in 1956, Euai
strong is the impulse to seek the light at the end of the interrationa. tnne:
Among the Tory constituency one can find a significant stratum in the aglish
middle class which reacts uneasily to what seem to be anti=UN police and at=-
titudeso If some British minds operate on the basis of Real polltill: thereJ ae
active women's groups, for instance, which function as at least a potential
restraint, not to say corrective.
But having said all this, one must still conclude that in its planing th
Government places a very low priority on the UN in the unfolding of B
foreign policy in the period ahead, discounts almost entirely its aliuq in the
fields of security, and tends to consider it a positive menace in the real of
colonial affairs., Even in the area of pacific settlement of dispute4s, o
Offic o7ficials coAnfos private.y that Sir (lady J s extaodir:y
o i"n the US in 1950 and 1951 in a of ha d cf
10,, I45,p ,6
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powers for the UN not only was--as we know-a tactic to offset the negative
British position on the Uniting for Peace resolutdon of 1950, but-which
was till a matter of curiosity--reflected no genuine official interest in
augmented pacific settlement activity, and has not been followed up at all-,
View from the Left
The stereotype on the left-hand side of the spectrum is considerably
more complicated. For one thing, the assertions of a party out of powcr
f.requently bear no resemblance to its policies once it is requred tot
over responsibility, More intrinsically, Labor party attitudos on the aui=
ject of the UN divide between the "softs" and the "toughs" far mor-. than
within Tory leading circles, And finally, the Labor party is inItialy
involved with the internationalist commitments which both Socialism and
the intellegentsia in general have characteristically made In or ti
Rightist critics in England no less than elseuwhere tend to 1lump togeher
the whole nenemblc, Their allegations are familiar ones cn the Europ-cn
cnc: the left-twing has "captured" the British UN Associaion, and the
UN is sponsored only by the "socialist inteigentsia "
In fact, the British UN Association was bitterly divided over the
Suez action and still includes many sauL.anchly right-wing lmnta, whi
according to a lea.ding member, carry equal weight with the lfits in
Association councils, Certainly ono hearsz few echoes aidt3 di
ilusionmet of the postwar years of the rosition asserted in 19Y6 y
Laborite M.nister of State, that Britain is "determined to u the inst>
tutions of the United astions to kill power political"
Vol 241j~ 'J: >I
12a
The Labor party itself is divided as betweer. the intelligentsia and
Transport House, perhaps not so sharply as in Harold Laski's time, but
enough to identify Mr. Gaitskell as representative of the "softs" and
Aneurin Bevan-.his putative Foreign Secretary--as leader of the "toughs,"
Foreign policy in Great Britain tends to become national and not partisan,
but Aneurin Bevan is not necessarily Ernest Bevin; he is more of a Lloyd
George, and is expected by many to be significantly more parochial in hi4
outlook toward Europe and, it is deduced, the UN. Thus, what will probably
give definition to Socialist policy is the likelihood that the more tough-
minded and nationalistic Labor leade -a will dominate the internationalist,
wing in a future Labor Government,
Still, Aneurin Bevan, on the record, is by no means anti-UN2 "It
is in the United Nations and its Charter that the chief hope for peace
lies.," In the same article Bevan spelled out a philosophy which would iridi.
cate greater
use of the UN to cultivate -the areas with the closest economic ties to
Britain, probably at the expense of relations with areas without such ties,
eg. the United States.12 It is entirely possible that a Labor Government
1will pay for greater support of the UN in the coin of lessened conformity
with American policies, In reverse, this is the stratagem of which the US
stood accused in British eyes at the time of Suez, and indeed throughout the
entire Middle East argument
It was mentioned earlier that high civil servants and Conser a1ive poli-
tilans alike rather completelv discount the capacity of the UN to affect
British security except perhaps in an invidious sense But the putative
Defense Secretary in the Labor shadow cabinet, George Brown, is regarded as
"tough" on security issues; he is considered most unlikely to encourage UN
"interference" with British vital strategic interests if and when he takes
office,
A curious sequence of events at the time of Suez complicates further
the image of Labor party attachment to the UN and may explain some of its
paradoxical features. In the early hours of the Suez crisis the Labor "Shadow
Government" issued several public declarations, none of which mentioned the
UN Charter, The pacifist wing of the Party, profoundly uninterested in the
security provisions of the Charter, nonetheless was quick to remedy the early
omission and to invoke other Charter provisions in order to establish potent
and "objective" moral and legal grounds for opposing the Government at a
moment when British troops were under fire, The Tory countreaction was,
for this as well as for other reasons, hostile to the UN, In the words of
12, Aneurin Bvan, "Britain and America at Loggereads," Foreign Affairs,
October 1957, Vo, 36, o i, pp, 62, 66,
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one Labor party official, his party is consequently "stuck" with supporting
the UN and its Charter, whatever their defects.
This should not be intorpreted as denying the sharpness of policy differ-
ences between Government and Opposition. It does, however, throw light on
another feature of British--and European-policies toward the UN: widespread
popular ignorance of the facts about the UN and consequent public vulnera-
bility to prejudice and bias. According to one Labor party leader, many in
England who had never before even heard of Article 51 of the Charter immedi-
ately became experts and quoted it in extenso in justifying the Government's
action in Egypt in 1956. In its own way each side became both the inciter
and the victim of what Canning once called "the fatal artillery of public
excitation."
Whatever the sequence of events and whatever the motivation at the time
of Suez, clearly the Labor party is inclined to a decidedly more "liberal"
view toward the UN's potentialities. (Indeed, some Labor spokesmen privately
express concern that the US, for all its genuflections to the UN and the
role of law in the world, is actually hostile to the UN.) The genuine dif-
ferences in attitudes spring from a number of profound differences in the
way the two sides tend to view such fundamental questions as the decline of
British power and overseas rule, the true nature of the indigenous forces at
work in the :'iddle East and Africa, and the morality of continued "colonial"
rule of overseas possessions. If the Socialists are, loosely and selectively
speaking, the heirs of Rousseau, Karl Marx, and Lloyd George, the Tories
share the legacy of Burke, Disraeli, and Winston Churchill. The American
alliance is prized by the Conservatives above all, it would seem, for its
assurance of solidarity among the dominant powers of the West, with an
imDlicit philosophy perhaps best expressed by ?ato when he wrote
Is it not a simple fact that in any form of
government revolution always starte from the
outbreak of internal dissention in the ruling
class? The constitution cannot be upset so
long as that class is of one mind, however
small it may be.
In this frame of mind every deviation by the United States in support of
the non-Western forces of the Middle East and Africa is seen as a betrayal
of one's class, certainly the most deplored of all classic social crimes in
England. Labor's spokesmen believe history to be on the side of the anti-
colonial movement, however much they may regret its excesses and the per.
sonalities such as Nasser who are riding its tides. They believe, for example,
that Britain cannot and should not remain as a foreign presence in the Middle
East, and consequently they see the UN as a useful agency in helping to usher
Britain out of the region with minimum loss and national humiliation. More
than that, they wish to see established more durable and "democratic" rela-
tions with Middle East countries, in the process rejecting the black-and-
white conservative portrayal of Nasser as the "enemy" and the pashas as the
"friends."
It should not be supposed that a UN role for the Middle East is purely
a partisan issue0 Even apart from more recent developments ending in UN
action in Lebanon and Jordan, Viscount Montgomery, for example, recommended
in May of 1957 that the UN General Assembly should guarantee the territorial
integrity of the Middle Eastern countries, thus relieving Britain of further
military responsibilities,, But a sharp demarcation line does exist
130 Quoted by C, L, Sulzberger in New York Times, May 8, 1957,
between the two positions, (There is a curious imbalance between the "realism"
that many British believe they show with respect to Communist China and their
dominant attitude toward other revolutionary forces at work in the noncommunist
world, In the same month--February 1958- when a poll in the US showed 66%
opposed to seating Communist China in the UN with only 17% in favor, the British
figures were 51% in favor and 21% opposed,)1
The lines are perhaps sharpest when it; comes to viewing the UN as an
agency for I rge-scale economi.c planning and operations0 Labor explicitly
urges that the UN be used as the prime inst ument for the financing of
economic development of underdeveloped countnes, At the least it should be
used to channel bilateral aid to the recipient,- Conservative opposition to
this philosophy is depicted by Labor as evidence of the Tory anti-UN bias
(although it is reminiscent of the similar reli tance of the US Republican
administration, which since the time of Suez his certainly never been accused
by the British of having an anti-UN bias). T?'us the Labor party is on record
in favor of SUN'ED, expanded UN Technical Assistance, and similar multi-
lateral undertakings. But it appears to be 'octrinaire with respect to the
program, not necessarily with respect to th: framework0  The UN is the best
way, but next best would be a Colombo Plan framework expanded to accomodate
the US and wider Commonwealth representatJ an.
If Britain is in a minority positioj in the UN today, and if indeed the
West as a whole will be in a minority por ition tomorrow, the pro-UN spokesmen
see such positive programming as essent al to maintain and develop political
support, This attention to the positir 3 possibilities of the UN, given
l4o Unpublished British poll, (There was an interesting shift of opinion on
this matter shortly after Suez, I oth inside and outside the Government'
Some of those strongly opposed b US policy seemed to become aware of the
hazards in buttressi ng further he Afro-Asian bloc in the UN, There is,
however, evidence that criticia of US policy once again prCdominatso)
0 6
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constructive Western policies, finds favor in independent British thinking
today. As The Economist put it:
tThe UN.,7 is the best world forum we have. To
flout it, or worse, to boycott it, would be to
turn down innumerable opportunities of exerting
influence.... It may be easier for a nation that
finds itself condemned by the great majority of
its fellows to shed some of its illusions....
What would be inexcusable would be to pretend
that the assembly does not exist and to throw
away the opportunities it offers for aligning
national policy with the policies of as many other
nations as possible-or at least, when that course
is barred, for explaining national policy with
sincerity and patience to a unique audience whose
members, whatever else divides them, have a gene-
ral interest in peace.15
Suez, the UN, and the US
The conclusions which many responsible (and irresponsible) Britons drew
from the UN's performance in the dual crises of October-November 1956 had a
special poignancy in the light both of the earlier expectations and the
already disturbing realities about the UN. The frustration of the Suez
attack was, to many, final proof that British security was deemed irrelevant
by the UN (to say nothing of the US) even when the most profound vital
British interests were at stake. And if security was ill-served, justice
fared even worse, in British eyes, when one compared with the clamant inter-
national pressures on Britain, France and Israel to withdraw, the unwilling-
ness of the UN similarly to punish the Soviet Union for her transgressions
in Hungary.
On this last score it is by no means as clear in Britain as, say, in
France, that beneath the fierce talk there existed.a real willingness to
15. The Economist, December 1, 1956, p. 760.
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send a UN force into Hungary in response to the appeal of the short-lived
Nagy Goverment, with the possibly fateful consequences fear of which deterred
the US from following such a course.
But even if the Hungarian comparison still being made by responsible
Britons is taken purely as a debating point-which is what it essentially is-
the confusion of factors which brought about the cease-fire and withdrawal
from Egypt still encourages marW British to assign the blame first of all to
the UN (and secondly to the US.) Those who should know say that Harold Mac-
millan, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was "sing3e-handedly rcsponsibles for
the Cabinet decision to abort the Suez operation, on the ground of a poten-
tially disastrous run on sterling. It is impossible to assign an accurate
weight to this factor compared, for example, with the effect on Washington
of Soviet threats--which few Europeans took seriously-and the consequent
effect on the UN of Washington's determination to end hostilities. But
whether completely rational or not, the UN is seen by those who supported
the Suez operation as the primary villain.
What of the acute break with multilateralism, however temporary, that
Suez represented? Could it happen again? In Tory circles one will travel
far to find any serious questioning of the moral and political worth of the
Suez operation; only the tactical failures are feelingly criticised and de-
plored. Self-doubt may lurk beneath., but .on the surface one often finds the
inevitable surrogate for self-doubt--assignment of blame to the U.S. Actu-
ally, the defections within the Commonwealth at the time of Suez represented
an even more traumatic psychic woundi and perhapps for that reason are rarely
talked about. Indeed, officials concerned with Commonwealth Relations say
that Suez, as such, was never discussed in Commonwealtli meetings afterward,
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and by the middle of 1957 the defects of the UN Charter could be discussed
among the Commonwealth Prime Ministers with only the most oblique reference
to the events of 1956,16
Mention has been made of the-road4aies-o-f-senior government officials,
in private conversation, to apply the language or psychopathology in speaking
of Sir Anthony Eden's attempted solution by force; (.Foreign Office officials,
incidentally, are prepared to swear under oath that the UK Delegation to the
UN in mid-October 1956 was totally in the dark with regard to Mr. Eden's
military plans. Since various dates for such action were publicly rumored
from time to time during that period, this is taken to mean that the UK dele-
ration had no knowledge of any firm plan nor of the timing of the proposed
operation.) In the political center this opinion is not uncommon, and indeed
influential journalists predict freely that if it were realized that at least
in theory Britain can get along without Middle East oil, it will be appreci-
ated that even if the oil "lifeline" is atain jeopardized Britain would
"never do it again." On the Labor side, it is considered unthinkable that a
Suez could happen under a Socialist Government. But a former Socialist
Cabinet official significantly added to this prediction the ironic words:
"without American support." On balance, one is inclined to go along with a
wise European journalist who concludes that the British have "learned far more"
from Suez than the French, (who continue to blame the US without any very
evident self-doubts).
One consequence of the Suez experience is an unmitigated private bitter-
ness and hostility on the part of some Conservative leaders toward the US
16. See e.g. report of London meeting in New York Times, July 3, 1957.
Secretary of State. The reasons for this have been voluminously reported
and documented elsewhere, Curiously enough, Labor leadership, even while
applauding the American dedication to "principle" in opposing the Suez
action, appears equally critical of Mr. Dulles but on different grounds: his
lack of appreciation, in their eyes, for the psychological niceties of a
mutually sustaining relationship, The reference made earlier in this paper
to the generalized British sense of loss and diminution of stature, even
mo-ng "iteriationalist" circles, is undcrscored by a high Oppositoion ire's
ra t hr plaintive observation that M1r, Dulles speaks with gcnuin la r
only of Germany0  This top-level Labor view sees thc A n t
as fundamentally unsatisfactory because the US is able to act alonl adrh
UK is noto
Europeand the ional Formula
British attachment to regional arrangerents a'is a pime basis for Yultim
lateral security was of course reflecked in vro ChurchlVl es wvartim rop
that the UN should be built upon the "leg" of regional orgaa n
Churchill spelled this thought out in -1P8
,.othere should be several rcgional councils,
august but Subordinate e o these should fora the
massive pillars upon which the world organiza,
tion would be founcd in majesty and calm,,
This proclivity has always been in thae background, during perioe n
reliance on the UN very quickly gave way to relince on US poeroBu no
even the latter poses some question British dcfense planners have ban re-
cently letting it be known that in the ight of nev Soviet, i e ilities
Europe Unge (ostn Hougtoniflin 192),4 36
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they do not feel they could count on America's willingness, when the chips
were down, to apply her nuclear power in defense of what might appear to be
predominantly British interests. It is of more than passing interest that
Mr. Duncan Sandys, Mr. Churchill's son-in-law and presently Defense Minister,
was the first secretary of the European movement. Taking strategic uncer-
tainty about American power together with the disillusionment about the UN
as a security instrumentality, British eyes may increasingly turn toward
Europe as the natural partner in defense during the years ahead; at the
moment, this is the view of only a minority on the Conservative side.
In this tendency British advocates of a greater "Europe" have not only
overcome the historic British view., of the continent and especially France as
the traditional enemy (as late as 1935 British coastal artillery personnel
readily explained to this writer that their guns were laid in a way to ful-
fill their primary mission-defense egainst France). They have also overcome
their own earlier argument that commitments vis-aivis the Commonwealth pre.
vented closer association with the European Movemente According to prominent
Conservatives today, the economic viability of Britain and her Commonwealth
relationships remain as governing priorities; but there is no longer a suro
sense that involvement with Europe vould automatically conflict with those
priorities Indeed, some suggest that the Commonealth argument .s primarily
a rationale for inaction, now found to be unnecessary. While the Britioh-
sponsored Free Trade Zone failed to come into being, concessions by the Comnon
Market nations have the same effect at least temporarily in terms of reconciling
the Commonwealth preferential tariff system rith British rolationships with
the European venture.
Labor attitudes toward Europe, regionalism and the UN, are quite differ.
ent. Being less enthusiastic than the Torie about NATO as a prime framework
for future British security, Socialist leade ,s oppose the use of European
regional machinery for activities in underdeveloped countries on the ground
that such machinery is tainted by association uith NATO, But, more basically,
Labor has displayed little enthusiasm for the toncept of Britain as a part
of "Europe" because without Socialist governmentl in power throughout Europe
the Socialist program in England might be jeopardLzedo This was particulrly
the case from 1947 to 1950 when the Labor Governmen, was in office, but it
still conditions the Labor position, Labor spokesmen conceda "Europeus"
growth in popularity in Britain, particularly by contrat to the bl Yet
their approach to Europe is still hesitant and reluctant: and perhaps on
balance this is the attitude of the majority of Englishmen. One shrewd Labor
politician characterized the Conservative position as a co ' nation of dis-
illusionment with the Commonwealth and distrust of the US, coln inaing to pro-
duce a love affair with Europe on the rebound. This is, as nott 1. a partial
truth only-
One possible development for the future is an evident interes rti
larly in the Government, in the possibility of forging organic links etween
regional organizations in the non-Communist world0  This cincept is u a
ficially reminiscent of Secretary Dulles' suggestion along these linea the
NATO meeting in December 19571 Mr. Dulles at the same time disclaimed. I y
18, See statement of December 16, 1957, paartment_of 'tat _Bu)ltin, Jaen
ary 6, 1958, P. 10.
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intention of creating a world network in competition with the UN, but no
such dilemma disables the British. To the extent that the notion of "inter-
dependence" is accepted, Britain is still looking for congenial international
frameworks for the controlled development of that concept. The background
of this trend is worth summarizing: an inclination toward regional rather
than global approaches to security; a sense that Britain is in a permanent
minority position in the world and must--as at times in her past--live with
dignity and style, however unpopularly, within that role rather than neces-
sarily seek ways to change and someiow adapt to the majority position; and
a consequent discounting of the UN as a useful agency for advancing British
interests,
Regionalism and Commonwealth havt, in the general British view, proved
their worth to British interests, and, beyond that, they have proved their
wQrth in doing some of the jobs the UN was set up to do. Officials of the
Ccmmonwealth Relations Office believe that quiet diplomacy "within the family"
has been more effective with resnect to Kashmir and Indian-Pakistani-South
African relations--both long-time UN cases--than the more public type of
diplomacy in the UN which, in their eyes, has exacerbated both matters.
As for regionalism, Foreign Office planners are particularly struck by
the possibilities of the kind of inter-regional "interdependence" cited above.
Britain and the Future of the UN
Perhaps because a whole range of British political and strategic estimates
are undergoing a major evolution, however quietly, British vision regarding
the possible future uses of the UN to advance her interests tends to be some-
what clouded. There is a profound silence on this subject today, extraordinary
by contrast with the drastic suggestions employed by many Britons after Suez
to vent their load of frustration and humiliation, It did not take very long
for informed people to regain their sense of the limitations in reform that are
imposed by political reality,
There are, however, some substantive issues that do arouse British com-
mento. The burden of national security falls heavily indeed on modern Britain,
and for this reason she looks with fairly intense interest and hope to the
continuing disarmament discussions held under the auspices of the UN. Here,
S re, the UN has a positive appeal and value to British interests,
Elsewhere in the realm of security little creative thinking is being dione,
perhaps because even apart from basic skepticism toward the UN as a security
agency, there is a built-in resistence to half-way and unsatisfactory pro-
cedures that would nonetheless tie British hands for the future, British
lack of enthusiasm for the Uniting for Peace resolution in 1950 carried with
it the premonition that, as actually came to pass in 1956, it might be invoked
against Great Britain, Today it is referred to in Coaservative circles as
"diabolical>"
For the same reasons, there is no enthusiasm such as one can find, for
example, in Canada, for a permanent UN force akin to UNEF. UNEF itself has
comle to be valued surprisingly highly, but the national habit of pragmatism
and of ad hoc solutions to problems as they arise persuades many responsible
British in and out of government that the existence of a standing UN force
would constitute a "temptation" to the "irresponsible" nations to use it, per.
haps at the expense of the "minority" in which Britain chooses to see herself,
On the other hand, the UK gave generous support to President Eisenhower's pro.
posal to the UN Emergency Assembly in August 1958 for a "stand-by" U peace
forc1,1 peihaps because no satisfactory future coul be seen for the British
~,0 ugut 1d 1921k 1ported in NW York T7.mes, August 15, 1958.
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troops flown into Jordan the month before, Beginning with the referral
of the Palestine impasse to the UN in 1947, Britain has now had several
experiences, some happy and others, like Palestine, highly unappreciated,
of UN substitution for British power in liquidating untenable commitments.
Indeed the persistent feeling that the UN failed really to take Palestine
off the British back strongly conditions London's readtione to propoal3
that the UN "take over" Cyprus, for exarmple.
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In nonconservative and nongovernment circles, however, there are frequent
proiosals for greater use of international instrumentalities.' The Economist
has advanced some particularly thoughtful suggestions for a system of "select
committees" which could bridge the gap between the overworked--but invaluable--
Secretary General and the quite unmanageable Assembly. But, as even Mr.
Gaitskell pointed out, the future of the UN depends not on changes in machi-
nery but on the policies adopted by the leading democratic powers.2 1
Regarding the Secretary General, the Tories are convinced that Mr. Ham-
marskjold was definitely prejudiced in favor of Egypt in the 1956 crisis.
from t.ii they ~cerlude that the way to avoid having _n Secretary General
nct ultra vires is to return to the long-favored, time-tested concept of
limited, controlled diplomacy, which in the UN can only mean the Security
Council. (Students of British diplomatio history will recall the model of
self-effacement set in the League of Nations by Britain's one coritribution
to the post of Secretary General: Sir Hugh Drummond.)
Others, however, see great value in the Secretary General's role, one
publication comparing it to that of a titular feudal monarch empowered with,
at a minimum, Bagehot's sovereign's "right to warn."2 2 Further to the left,
one finds appeals for an expanded role for the SYG in his indispensable role
of "third-party" in deadlocked disputes.
20. The Economist, April 13, 1957, p. 110. See also the extremely penetrating
articles about the UN in that issue, also the issues of December 1, 1956,
and January 26, March 16, March 30, September 14, and December 28, 1957.
21. Hugh Gaitskell, op_. t.., p. 37.
22. See The Economist, March 30, 1957, p. 1074.
On the evidence, one may well looK for movement in British policy in
the direction of greater regional arid interregional affiliation perhaps at
the serious expense of the UN, It can be anticipated that British planners,
in seeking to fabricate more stable ties with the new nations of Africa and
Asia, would look first to the Commonwealth and second to expansion of Colombo
Plan type programs, perhaps accompanied by informal consultations with
Europe, the US, and even the new groupings that are emerging in the form of
a greater Arabia, the Mahgreb, Black Africa, etc. In this type of develop
ment the UN is seen as playing only a minor role so long as Britain regards
herself and is regarded as a colonial power, In time, as that label be=
comes not only obsolescent but obsolete, Britain may discover that she sharcs
unexplored interests with a far greater numiber of nations than at preasent,
But the tide is still in the other direction, and the trend toward a lessened
British commitment to global organization was significantly symbolized in a
little-noticed unilateral British action in April 1957, quietly but sharply
restricting still further the tems of her acceptance of the compulsory juris-
diction of the International Court of Justice,23
But events and the British genius for accomodating to history are also.W
working their ferment in other directions. This evolution becomes ccele ed
as thoughtful British leaders come to realize that the new patter-n of ciange
may not unfold in either an orderly or a leaisurely way, As the world piuge
from one crisis to another there may be a quickening of the British senae of
shared interests and a consequent inclination to make more dynamic 11s o
British diplomatic skill and other resources in a world forunt, The Britis3h
Government in the late summer of 1958 suddenly displayed extraordinary inter-
eat in having the United Nations "take over" the problem of J a position
23, United Kingdom e Interntional Court of JusticeDeclarttio t
the SecretargGeneral of then ThrugtdNiojs 3  Ye
1957, Cind., 2L9 (London, ,. Sc, 1957)
that a few years ago would have been unthinkable. Jordan is symbolic of the
kind of imporsible problem facing a nation whose commitments have long since
outrun her resources and many of whose notions of international politic: are
today as deficient strategically as they are brilliant tactically,.
The future relationship between Britain and the UN comes to rest., then,
on two fundamental propositions, First, among the countries of the white
"European" West, national estimates of the utility and capabilities of the
U ted t vary in rect proportion to the political incubi which the
country rma-,y still be c-arrying in the toIn of overis:iea colons and dp
ica., Second, cir-u-stances alter cazse; Jrdan-and Kuwa:.it and Bhrin
and Aden and ultimately the whole British po3ition in the Near Eas-may wel.
be dteriorating to the point of eventual diaster 0  The -p lication of
Wstern force is neither acceptable rior inded effective in stemming the
trend, An international organization that clade s both ides iay well
become i penable to build the kinds of bridgcs with the never nations
that Britain came in the past to build with India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana,
and Malaya-all once as virulently natioeaistic nd anti-Brtish as tuis
Arab nations0
If these things happen, perhaps the UN will be sen to have snifie-ntly
nev uses and new positive values for Britin, interp'reted in the viocabulry of
her own fundaiental national interests, The time may not be far awy when
British rather than foreign planners seriously consider -the possibilitieo
iUntherent in, for example, UN trusteeships for the reaining 1ritish protac-
torates around the periphery of the Arabian penuls., A3 the London Observer
remarked in July 1958, in aerting the indispensability of the U
h I nd the, ver is
who' ha, 1v;e criatici'sed "'t motsrnl aeOnlyt"
glC tlo tr to i t whn tir pliie_,r
9 "
Or, as The Economist commented a month later,
,..if the Foreign Secretary has been reconverted
to faith in the over-riding authority of the Uni-
ted Nations, almost anything is now possible, 21
is is an overstatement- To his own party at Blackpool Prime
Minister Macmillan justified Britain's "rescue operation" in Jordan in a
tone that echoes back into a less baffling and frustrating age, "So long
as the veto in the Security Council remains," he said, "there must always
be occasions when the great powers cannot evade their duties," But he went
on: "They must prevent aggression while there is still time. Then, having
completed that immediate task, they must hand it to the nations of the world
for collective action." 2 5 It may be anticipated that in her own way Great
Britain will adjust her vision of the United Nations to the larger vision
now developing with respect to her place in the new world of the second
half of the twentieth century, One can assume with equal safety that the
two visions will vary as little as is realistically possible from the
directives that have governed British foreign policy for a century, set
down in 1869 in Gladstone 's famous letter to Queen Victoria
England should keep entire in her own hands
the means of estimating her own obligations upon
the various states of facts as they arise; she
should not foreclose and narrow her own liberty
of choice by declarations made to other Powers,
in their real or supposed interests, of which they
would claim to be at least joint interpreters; it
is dangerous for her to assume alone an advanced
and therefore isolated position, in regard to
European controversies; come what may it is
better for her to promise too little than too much;
she should not encourage the weak by giving expecta-
tion of aid to resist the strong, but should rather
24, The Economist August 2, 1958t p, 352,
25, Quoted in New York Time) October 12 1956.
seek to deter the strong by firm but moderate lan-
guage from aggression of the weak; she should seek
to develop and mature the action of a common, or
public or European opinion, as the beat standing
bulwark against wrong, but should beware of seem-
ing to lay down the law of that opinion by her
own authority, and thus running the risk of set-
ting against her, and against right and justice,
the general sentiment which ought to be, and 26genernlly would be, arrayed in their favour,
26, Quoted by Harold Nicolson in Diplomacy (London: Oxford, 1950),
Second Edition, p, 137,
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THE DRNTEMPORART BETGIAN VTEW OF THE UN
Introduction
Two prime thrusts of Belgian foreign policy shape the Belgian
outlook regarding the UN.
One is the product of modern Belgian history, beginning with a
"permanent neutrality" guaranteed by the Great Powers in the treaties of
1830-39 that ended in German violation of that neutrality in the First
World War, with a cost to Belgium of' approximately seven billion dollars
for her unwilling involvement. In the early interwar years Belgium's
dependence on the new principle of collective security under the League
of Nations was presumably reinforced by the' equilibrium established by
the Locarno Treaty. But by October 1936, gravely concerned by the pos-
sibility of new involvement with Germany as a consequence of the Franco-
Soviet Treaty, Belgium denounced her military alliance with France, and
in this mood took comfort from Germany's guarantee to her the following
hear of her inviolability if she remained "neutral." When war broke out
in September 1939 Belgium mobilized, but proclaimed her neutrality. But
the collapse of the European and world-wide security system in the face
of renewed German militarism terminated, for Belgium, in four years of
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enemy occupation., Add to this history a new cycle of commitment and hope in
the United Nations of 1945 followed by profound disillusionment with its capa-
city directly to protect Belgian security, and the result is a rather overpower-
ing cynicism toward international relations and especially toward the capacity
of the Great Powers, on whom Belgium yet remains utterly dependent, to order
their affairs to Belgian satisfaction,
The "betrayal" of Belgian neutrality, combined with a sense of having been
"burned" by dependence on the League, produces a highly ambivalent reaction to-
ward the Great Powers and toward the UN.
The two historic poles of the Belgian attitude toward the UN are represent-
ed in statements by perhaps her foremost international spokesman, M, Paul-Henri
Spaak, In 1948 he was able to write that
when a recommendation has been adopted solemnly
by the General Assemblyo . the duty of each of
those nations is to bow before the decisions of
the Assembly, even if it has opposed the recom-
mendations, even if it believes that recoymenda-
tion to be contrary to its own interests.
Nine years later, in the weeks after overwhelming UN majorities--not in-
cluding Belgium--had voted for the cease-fire and withdrawal of Western forces
from Egypt, he wrote:
Cit seems to me that never before has the in-
sufficiency of the UN as at present constituted
stood out so clearly I believe that it has 2never come so near to the brink of failure. ,
So far as relations with the Great Powers are concerned, Belgium sees in
the retrospect of her lugubrious history that she has been an unwilling pawn
in a far larger game0 But she sees with equal clarity that her fate will in-
escapably be determined by countries larger, richer, and more powerful than
L Paul-Henri Spaak, "The Role of the General Assembly," International Conciliation,
No, 445 (November 1948) pp. 596-597
2, Paul-Henri Spaak, "The West in Disarray," ForeignAffairs, Vol. 35, No, 2
(January 1957) p. 185,
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herself Here cynicism combines with realism to give a special impetus
to Belgian participation in the greater European movement, building out-
ward from Benelux to the Common Market and, eventually, European political
integration.
The other thrust in the Belgian outlook toward the UN is based on
her role as a colonial power. This set of attitudes combines the Belgian
position as administering power in both the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi with
the pervasive Belgian characteristic of commercial acuity As perhaps the
dominant theme of Belgian participation in the UN during the past twelve
years, this is treated below in some detail.
The UN and Vital Belgian Interests
With regard to the basic security problem of Belgium growing out
of her special position in geography and in history, there is little
argument among responsible Belgians with the proposition that the UN
per se is irrelevant to Belgian security now and in the foreseeable future,
There is greater argument between liberal and conservative forces in
Belgium about the other thrust of her UN policy, centering on the colonial
issue, Unlike England, neither of these issues is fought out on party lines,
and indeed the parties themselves are officially ,indifferent to the UN
issue0  Neither is there any detectable difference regarding these matters
as between the Walloons of Southern Belgium and the Flemish-speaking popu.
lation of the North, however perceptible may be other social and economic
tensions between them.
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Yet beneath the surface there is a more profound similarity with the
English picture, As in England, the domestic forces hostile to the United
Nations tend to cluster on the conservative side, in both government and busi-
ness, The forces most sympathetic to Belgian membership and participation in
global organization are to be found in "liberal-socialist" circles, in nongovern-
mental organizations, workers' associations, and the like. But the latter does
not add up to "popular support," for by all the evidence the population at large
is not very interested in the UN, The Belgian UN Association has no real popu-
lar following,, (It would seem that the US and possibly Western Germany are the
only Western countries where such organizations do enjoy fairly significant
public interestv not to say support.)
Nonetheless, one senses that there may exist a greater reservoir of popular
sympathy and support for the UN than the characteristically negative attitudes
within Government 'and conservative leadership circles would indicate, Certainly
outside those circles one can find a less predictable reaction than the one
elicited from many responsible Belgians who, if one touches them and says the
words "United Nations," most commonly produce a single automatic reflex response:
"Congo." This conditioned reaction has one prime meaning in such circles: the
UN, whatever it is or is not in other fields, is above all an embarrassment and
obstacle to Belgium with respect to her colonial policies What more than one
independent observer refers to as "the enlightened part" of the Belgian govern-
ment has, to be sure, made use of the UN on occasion in more positive contexts,
Even on the most sensitive point, leading personalities such as Pierre Ryckmans,
former Governor General and often critic of the UN, have sought to instruct the
Belgian people about the changing nature of colonial relationships, specifically
via--vis the Congo.
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But the more common view, particularly in the center and right, has been,
first of all, an acceptance of Belgiumla general obligations under the Charter;
second, an unwillingness to have those obligations extended; third, a generalized
suspicion of the UN as it egme to do precisely that; fourth, a confusion, par-
ticularly in parliamentary circles, between the obligations rather grudgingly
accepted in connection with the trusteeship over Ruanda-Urundi and the far more
permissive obligations imposed by Chapter XI of the Charter with respect to the
Congo; and fifth, a conviction, shared above all with France and, to a lesser
extent, Britain, that the dynamics of African nationalism and the spread south-
ward of Islam constitute a prima facie menace to Belgium that must be fought
rather than compromised with,
The Colonial Issue
Let us become more specific, The basic reaction to the contemporary UN in
official and conservative Belgian circles gives the colonial problem undisputed
primacy as a touchstone of attitudes and performance, As indicated, "UN" means
above all "Congo," Belgium,, it is insisted, must be "left alone" to develop
the Congo "toward independence,," But if the process goes too fast, so runs the
argument, the Congolese will in their unsophistication turn to the East for thei-
future orientation.. Like the British, Belgian officials in private conversations
paint a picture in which they see themselves as the adults and their critics,
including the US, Asia, and in fact the entire UN majority, as immature and ir-
responsible. Belgium is proud of its "creative work" in Africa and the "great
job" it is now doing, It is "grown up enough" to know what the Congo needs, and
wants no interferences the UN "should keep its nose out."
3 A Belgian vi.aw at variance with the type of conservative posi tion re Aferred t4
in this section is found in La Be'lgique et Les Natiins Unies, prepared for the
C Endowment by L Institut Royal Des Relations It erni o (New Yorkd
n 9his work treate comprehensively the histo of Belgia0
"'N
Without making a detailed analysis of the values to Belgium of her colonies,
a few facts are clears 1) It is the Congo rather than Ruanda-Urundi which
excites Belgium's Dolitical and commercial nerves in the UN context, Ruanda-
Urundi is poor, over-populated, and dependent on Belgium, which makes up its
annual deficit
. 
On balance, the cost of administering it is a heavy financial
liability for Belgium,, 2) The Congo, on the other hand, has a favorable
balance of trade with Belgium (technically, with the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic
Union) by a ratio of almost two to one. 3) The Congo is one of the leading
uranium producers in the free world., 4) Belgium has not used her African
colonies for purposes of "colonization," despite her own population density
(291 per square kilometer in 1955) which is the highest in all Europe except
6
the Netherlands and the Saar, and higher even than Japan, India or China, Thus
no colon problem such as bedevils the French in North Africa complicates the
almost purely economie basis for Belgiumas Congo relationship. As the official
British commentary on investment opportunities in the Belgian Congo observed:
"The Belgian business man is a keen Judge of a bargain, and will not allow
7
national sentiment to outweign his economic sense.."
Moving into the center of the political spectrum "liberal" conservatives
hold that since the Congo and Belgium are inseparable, the former will become
independent but "associated," Leaders of this stripe can be found urging the
Government to accelerate the development of the Congo, pointing to the disastrous
results of the past French stance of immobilisme. Even in these ranks the view
is commonly held that the UN has been an obstacle to Belgian aims in the Congo,
and it is likely that this is the popular impression as well, It is rare that
JR. Cotton, Belgian Congo andRuanda=Urundi, Overseas Economic Survey (Londont
HIMSo, 1957)' pL7,,
5 d ,p 53
A.~ " ~~az ~e .'nt t'r ~i 9Y~ 3 p~
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one hears the admission, made privately by a former Belgian delegate to the UN,
that UN debate has had the very useful effect of forcing on the administering
authority an annual examen de conscience, the value of which he esteemed rather
highly,
This "centrist" view of colonialism must not be taken as primitive or un-
feeling, Apart from the often elegant intellectual rationales advanced from the
professional ranks, some substantive suggestions of value often emerge here,
One leading Belgian administrator urged tha t te role of the International Labor
Organization be expanded in respect to dependent territories, He sees the ILO,
and not the UN, as both technically and legally competent to promote and administer
"international controls," Such Belgians are strongly influenced by the phenomenon,
often observed by others, that Latin American and Asian delegates in the ILO,
usually representing technical ministries rather than the foreign offices, tend
to be far more "responsible," The crucial argument is that such representatives
are often willing to discuss some of their own "dependent peoples" (aboriginal
populations, etc.,) in the ILO, while refusing such reciprocity in the UN proper
on the grounds of interference with their internal affairs,
Moving across the center to the political left, the conditioned reflex of
"UN-Congo" is, of course, not to be looked for, and indeed is vigorously refuted.
Most Belgians, it is said here, do not understand the implications of the issue,
and only the limited leadership circles of government and business give the Congo
e d honneur in their image of the UN,
Yet even here one does not necessarily find an undifferentiated defense of
the present UN, As one Belgian elder statesman put it, the anti-,colonial countries
that are coming to make up the UN majority are prejudiced, suspicious, and immature,
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and no one would pretend otherwise. But they also bring to the UN forum new
enthusiasms, open-mindedness and good will (two of which qualities other Belgian
statesmen would not be likely to ascribe in this connection). This offers an
opportunity which the West has neglected, particularly vis-a-vis India. Here
there is a curious admiration for India for having become the "strongest" part
of the UN by playing the "UN game," a game in which common rather than national
8interests are presumably pursued. The West, concluded this venerable and
honored Belgian, should exploit India's desire to strengthen the UN as its-
and our-main hope for peace. It must be said that this view of the UN, pro-
pounded by at least one significant figure in each of seven Western European
countries visited, is far from the thoughts of those responsible for policy
in the West today.
The announcement by the Belgian Government on January 13, 1959, of new
rmeasures leading to self-rule and, "without undue haste," eventual independence
for the Congo, will be watched by the growing anticolonial majority in the UIN
with suspicion based on past attitudes and on their inability to monitor and
accelerate the process through the political machinery of the UN itself')
The Impact of Suez and Hungary
The colonial issue in its turn furnishes a meaningful backdrop against
which to consider Belgian reactions to the dual crises of late 1956 As in 0o
many other European countries the Suez landings split Belgium sharply, although
not, as in England, along party lines. The first reaction inside the Foreign
Ministry was one of "not taking sides," This was not surprising in the light
of two other factors, For one thing, Belgium has significant commercial interests
in Egypt, and, as suggested earlier, rates her commercial position very highly
in the national scheme of values. For another thing, the traditional ties to
8, The obvious qualifications to this assertion are made explicit in "The United
Nations and the Indian National Ttorc zt," by Sudershan Chailla, Cinter fur
International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,1958.
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France--racial, social, linguistic, political--have undergone a profound change
since 1940. Since that time the Belgian attitude tends as much to criticism as
praise for her larger sister to the south. There were certainly those who hoped
for French success in Egypt, and these were of course the ones who saw in the
UN's political counteraction the height of injustice and, when contrasted to the
Hungarian picture, bitter irony, When M. Spaak returned to Belgium after the
crisis had passed he told his friends that in his view the UN offered nothing
to hope for and everything to fear. Yet the very failure of France to succeed
in Suez was also taken in Belgium as final proof of French impotenceo Since
that time the categories of ties with France have become reduced still further,
to the point where many Belgians limit them to the cultural field alone0
Spaak and other responsible Belgians drew public attention vigorously to
the contrast between the UN action in Suez and its failure to force compliance
in Hungary. But as in England this line seems to have been more rhetorical than
real, however genuinely felt, since the last thing Belgium wishes is to provoke
a European war with Russia.
The European Movement
It is in Europe--and NATO--rather than in universal world organization
that Belgium finds the new promise for her security,
For three years, from 1945 to 1948, Belgium experimented with a new and
short-lived form of "neutrality," seeking to play a conciliatory role betw4een
East and West and avoiding rigid positions on East-West issues., The Communist
co in- Czechoslovakia in February 1948 put a period to this illusory neo-
neutralism, and thenceforth Belgium's leaders saw clearly the necessity of
joining in alliances based on the right of collective self-defense envisaged
in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Brussels Pact in the next month, and the
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North Atlantic Treaty of April of the following year were the initial mile-
stones of the new Belgian policy., Yet while the postwar Soviet Union looks
to Belgium like a "new Hitler in disguises" the indefenaible Belgian strate-
gic position places a high premium on "bridging the gap between East and West,"
This gives Belgian policy toward "Europe" a curious symmetry when Belgians
speak of the European movement as a new focus for this other vital Belgian
interest. The third and perhaps most compelling attraction of a larger
European community is as a place where Belgium,, as a small nation, can pursue
her special identity, both in her natural region and in the UN as well, as part
of a larger and more authoritative political personality,
Regarding the values which Belgium, taken as a whole, sees in federation
with Europe, views across the political spectrum do not show any marked dif-
ferencea, either in themselves or as angles of vision on the Belgian future
attitude toward the UN, Attitudes toward NAM0 are decidedly more partisan than
toward Europe as such, with liberal opinion accepting the whole idea of NATO
only grudgingly, while more conservative opinion assigns to its future a con-
siderably higher priority than that of the UN,
Belgian conservatives carry the same power-orientation into their approach
to Europe. Belgium, it is said here, is anxious to become part of a federated
Europe in order to multiply its world influence, including a more powerful voice
in the councils of the UN, This is of course a reprise on the theme of Belgium
as a power whose influence is, or at least should be, far larger than her modest
size and military strength would suggest,
IP t4
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Regarding the Europe-N equation, liberal Belgian circles tend to see
Europe as a serious partner in concrete economic and political tasks, while
assigning to the UN a more abstract context in which the goal is "human pro
gresse" A former Socialist Deputy turned this around by saying that while
Belgium often was required to say or do something "negative" in the UN, the
task of "leading" the European movement offered a constructive and positive
challenge, And inevitably the economic benefits of integration loom large
specifically in widening the free market for Belgium as important output of
manufactured goods6 (Here the contrast is especially marked with Italy, for
example, where many small producers perhaps irrationally fear the effects of
outside competition, and consequently oppose the whole trend of European in.
tegration, ) The strength of Belgian motivation is illustrated by the sharp-
ness of private Belgian criticism of France for her "archaic chauvinism,"
seen as endangering the whole structure of Europe so long as France continues
to treat integration as a "pawn" in her internal political game,
US Policy
Mr. Dulles is admired by the Belgian Foreign Office to a considerably
greater extent than elsewhere in Western Europe, Where he is criticized out-
side the Government one senses that it is psychological rather than political--
a reflection of the more generalized resentment felt all over Europe as Ameri-
can "culture" seems to press in, and also because of a "sinister image" cast
up by earlier defects of US foreign policy, But on one score both Belgian
political wings seem united. US policy toward Communist China is "stupid,"
and Peiping should have her proper seat on the Security Council, It is diffi-
cult to sort out the bases for this view, which is well known to American
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diplomats, except to note the obvious one of anticipated trade. But at least
some of its strength may result from such estimates as that of one of Belgium's
leading retired statesmen, who was recently told by both Policy and Yugoslav
diplomats that Mao Tse-Tung is considered by their governments the best hope
for the independence of Communist countries. Mao, according to this line, is
fighting Stalinists in China but is weakened because he "can't open his window
on the Pacific." Despite Belgium's support, in September 1958, of the General
Assembly's decision to postpone the Chinese representation question for another
year, it can be assumed that Belgium will go along with any future effort to
break the moratorium and vote Peiping into the UN if and when the political
atmosphere becomes more propitious than at present.
Elsewhere in the UN scene, the chief criticism of US policy remains the
traditional one--the US should use its influence far more than it does to moderate
the anticolonial forces that have come to dominate the UN proceedings,
Planning for the Future
Belgium is so preoccupied, if not obsessed, with the UN's weakening effect
on her hold upon the African territories that her UN policy is largely character-
ized by defensiveness and negativeness.
Despite the efforts of some of her intellectuals and certain liberal
leaders, and despite the admirable long-term plans her Government is advancing
for the Congo, it is not an exaggeration to say that Belgium as a whole is still
living in an earlier political age in which the ruler-ruled relationship colors
the pattern of European-non-European relations. That age may be giving way to
a new era far more quickly than the average Belgian knows or wishes. But until
the new dynamics of Euro-African relations come to be grasped by the Belgian
majority, herstance in the UN will continue to have the nature of a rear-guard
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action. From the time the UN Special Committee on Information Transmitted
Under Article 73(e) of the Charter (now the Committee on Information from
Non-Self-Governing Territories) was established, Belgium took the position
that it was unconstitutionally created by the General Assembly. That it
should place "political" questions on its agenda made it totally ultra
vires so far as Belgium was concerned,
Other administering powers have shared Belgiumvs misgivings about the
Committee, and its career has been fairly stormy0  But since 1952 Belgium
has refused to participate in the Committee, thus joining a still tiny
group of states...the USSR, the Union of South Africa, and, during the
first years of life of the UN Commission on International Commodity Trade,
the United States-who, because they did not agree, would not take part
in discussions in bodies of which they were regularly constituted members
The chief gross prediction, therefore, with respect to Belgian parti-
cipation in and use of the UN, is that its tone and its capacity for con.
structiveness will change in direct ratio to larger changes in the way
Belgium views her relations with those nations rapidly forming a numeri-
cal majority in the world. Until this shedding of the old political ckin,
so to speak, new directions in the Belgian-U-N scheme would seem to be very
limited,
Within this rather limited context, how do responsible Belgian le a
sum up some of the possibilities they now see?
The business community, not unexpectedly, is enthusiastic about the
growing amounts of statistical information the UN is making available on
world trade and related subjects of practical use to businessmen, tradrs,
and colonial administrators.
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Conservatives feel the UN can do more in the settlement of "small" inter.
national disputes, and to this notion Foreign Office officials add the theme
of the moral power of UN recommendations--those, that is, which do not pre.
judice Belgium's colonial position.
Some Social Christian leaders have taken a particular interest in former
French Premier Faure's proposal for disarmament via the control of the budgets
of the major powers. In one of the few such suggestions heard in Belgium, they
entertain the possibility of utilizing such savings for the financing of econ-
omic development of underdeveloped countries, or, more originally, for expand! oei
exchange programs. (Belgium has had notably good results in her participation
in international exhanges of persons. )
It is only a small minority that seems to look ahead to greater use of
the UN for enhancing Belgium's contacts with the neutral nations of the world,
and an even smaller group that appears dedicated to the proposition that
Belgium, as a small country, is in a good strategic position to take initia-
tives in the UN that might profoundly influence the policies of the super.
powers.
Perhaps the most original argument advanced here, and one which by no
means yet appears to be a meaningful part of the Belgian pE3ision of the
future of the UN, takes as premise the history of American pressure upon
Europe to unite, and asks why the US does not now apply the same quality of
statesmanship and political pressure upon the members of a larger community
-. the UN--to move in the direction of greater supranational powers. That
this remains the view of only a tiny minority of Belgians may be ascribed to
a number of factors already cited. It goes without saying that such a premise
for policy presupposes not only a different kind of world than the one we
have today, but a very different Belgian strategic view of the world, of
her role in that world, and of the utility of the UN in achieving Belgian
purposes,
In foreign policy, however, events sometimes have the capacity for
altering the seemingly unalterable. Britain came to favor a UN presence
in Jordan in 1958. In the General Debate in the 1958 General Assembly
Belgium, through her Foreign Minister, suggested that the offshore islands
of Quemoy and Matsu, then inflaming the peace of Asia, be put "under the
protection of the United Nations."
The implications of such a proposal are not often spelled out, nor
is its price made explicit. If more authoritative powers are ever given
to the UN it will doubtless happen not out of acceptance of any blueprinted
theory, but as the consequence of an urgent political need which even those
most unsympathetic to the organization's defects and turbulences feel at the
time to be overriding,9
9, For summary of M. Wigny's remarks, see United Nations Review, November 1958,
Po 74,
THE CONTEMPORARY DUTCH VTEW OF THE UN
Introduction
Like other nations of mid-twentieth century Europe, the Kingdom of
the Netherlands has vivid memories of earlier ages in which its world-
wide influence far exceeded its proportions on the map of Europe. Unlike
some nations similarly diminished by history, the Dutch today deploy a
merchant fleet that in tonnage ranks sixth in the world.1 But despite
its continuing sea-going tradition the Dutch Empire has all but vanished
in one generation, except for West New Guinea and, in the Western hemis-
phere, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. Both the latter were given
autonomy in 1954. The other remaining chapter of Dutch colonialism-West
New Guinea--remains unsettled, for reasons which are touched on below, But
it is fair to say that the Dutch position in the UN in the past two or
three years has been associated, in many foreign eyes, with her continuing
dispute with Indonesia over the territory the latter seeks to acquire
under the irredentist label of West Irian.
That the "UN image" of the Netherlands may be a rather faulty one is
attested to by the small and almost irrelevant part the New Guinea problem
plays in the over-all Dutch order of things, including the vision of the UN
which some of her thoughtful and responsible leaders hold. Her role as a
l Not counting Panama and Liberia. See World Almanac, l1958, p. 6770
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participant in the new "Europe" is far more central to Dutch foreign policy
planning, The Netherlands has a long and in many ways astonishing history
of leadership in the cultural, artistic, religious, comercial, and legal
movements that made Europe the undisputed centerpiece of Western civilization
for four hundred years. But as a nation of 11 million in a world of billions,
the Dutch have also been in the forefront in seeking to submerge ancient narrow
nationalisms and move into a new phase of history0 Neutral and uninvolved in
European wars from 1850 to 1940, the Dutch have taken the lead in concrete pro-
jects for international cooperation and peace.,
Benelux was foreshadowed as early as 1930, with the Oslo Agreements, fol-
lowed by the Ouchy Convention of July 1932, reducing tariffs as among Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (although these arrangements were temporarily
dropped in 1938). Today in Benelux the Netherlands already has unique experi-
ence in regional arrangements which tend to minimize the significance of national
boundaries. That experience was reflected in the approval which the States.
General, the Dutch parliament, gave in 1952 to constitutional amendmcats making
the Netherlands one of the first countries to provide constitutionally for the
formal yielding of authority to supranational organizations.
Far from being oblivious to the retrograde influences of the postwar
years, the Dutch perceive the world around them with realism, The tradition
of international legalism dies hard in the home of Hugo Grotius, the Hague
Conferences of 1899 and 1907 that foreshadowed the League of Nations system,
and the continuing seat of the International Court of Justice in Mr. Carnegie e a
ornate Hague "Peace Palaceot " But there is a third quality, synthesizing both th
realism and Dutch dedication to superior European and world-wide order, which
gives the Netherlands a special place and a special opportunity. TAke three
0 1
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of the other smaller powers, Canada, Norway, and New Zealand, which fre-
quently furnish a disproportionate amount of leadership in the UN by their
capacity for inventiveness and for constructive solutions, the Netherlands
is almost unique, certainly among the remaining Buropean "colonial" powers,
for the kinds of ideas and policy proposals that some of her leaders are now
generating and could, a fortiori, generate if only the West New Guinea issue
could be removed from her agenda of preoccupations. The Dutch capacity for
constructive planning is by no means based on theoretical grounds. Savagely
mutilated by Germany in the Second World War, living with a population donsity
of 800 to the square mile--the highest in the world-and accustomed to nation-
wide exertions to hold back the sea, the Dutch seem almost historically destined
to give at least a degree of leadership in the long and painful catalogue of
man's experiments to learn to live together in relative harmony,
Dutch Interests and the UN
Foreign Ministry officials are explicit in their definition of Dutch
national interests: their small nation is, like Belgium, wholly "interde-L
pendent" with the Western powers. This alone identifies the overriding national
interest in the defense of the free world against communist aggressiono From
this it logically follows that the Netherlands must follow and support the
principal policies of her large and powerful allies. In the UN this means
general support for the latter-with the exception of the US policy toward
the exclusion of Communist China, In pursuing these objectives, senior Dutch
officials see the UN as highly useful in exposing Soviet policies to the rest
of the world, and they attach higher importance to the UN for this quality than
perhaps for any other,
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Perhaps the most striking theme in the specific relating of the
UN to Dutch interests is a reflection of the proud instinct for special
identity which echoes through Dutch history. The UN is seen as a use-
ful framework within which the Netherlands can distinguish itself from
other countries of equivalent size and nature, such as Denmark and Nor-
way, by participating in UN agencies which give concrete and politically
symbolic expression of wide Dutch interests. The UN regional economic
commissions are prime exampless the Economic Commissions for Latin
America (on which the Dutch sit because the Kingdom of the Netherlands
is "partially situated" in Latin America) and for the Far East furnish
a Dutch "presence" in the areas, particularly Asia, which in some ways
transcends in significance to the Dutch the colonial holding itself on
which such membership is based. (The Caribbean Commission, not part of'
the UN system, provides continuing Dutch presence in yet another area.)
But other Dutch interests impinge on these formulas. The attach-
ment to a rule of law in the world which some American statesmen rou.-
tinely proclaim, has, as suggested earlier, a more genuinely meaningful
connotation for the Netherlands. The profound disillusionment attributed
0 1
to Foreiz. ?inistor Luns aris in from the Ui s "betrayal of ideals"
in its handling of the Indonesian caso has doeoer roots in an exagerated
belief in the possibility of a legal order in the hore--and-now. This has
two implications for relations with the U1: the official Dutch view is
strongly colored by the collapso of extrava;ant expectations; and thie
Forei in T.inister who holds this view appears to be several steps behind
many of his compatriots in the hague in their assessment of the future
possibilities of the T11.
With the Socond Chaber--the popularly-elected house of the States
General-fairly evenly divided between the Catholic and Labor partios,
and with the country fairly equally divided between Protestants and
Catholics, there is a surprising consensus on these matters, The Labor
party view is not profoundly different from that of the Government, but
does contain some variations. In the view of some of its leaders, the
UNi, despite what it "did to the Dutch" in Indonesia, is above all useful
for contacts with underdeveloped countries, This in turn is related to
the conviction that the Cold War has become chiefly political and econom-
ic, and calls in turn for primarily political and economic strategies.
Having said this, a typical "elite" Dutch view would conclude that the
UN is not a meaningful instrunent of Dutch national policy, but that
the world situation would probably be worse without it. This lukewarm
attitude rosts, in the case of one distinguished statosman, on the
curious but consistent ground that the M is "weakor" than the League,
by which he 2eant that the League "respected law" (and also had a good
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secretariat).
On the Labor side it see:as equally believed that the U!I affords
opportunities so far not fully exploited to keep the adversary out in
the open-by which it is neant that Communist China as well as the USSR
should be visible. An interesting supplement to this view sees the
"reformatory" quality of the UT as bearing equally on the peaceful
evolution of the T.iddle East: the Arabs are now being required to
live within the "Charter symbols."
Dutch "third parties" are in some ways historical anomalies. But
the loader of one who was asked to form a Government only a few years
ago managed to sum up some of the themes touched upon by others. Agree-
ing that the present Foreign Uinistor rogards the UN as a complete poli-
tical failure, he regards this as an even stronger reason for build-
ing up the UNs economic program. Agreeing that Dutch--and other--ex-
pectationswere unrealistically high, he rocomends that expectations
be limited and that in a mood of patience the UT can be seen as having
kept such tinder boxes as Korea and Israel relatively stable over rather
long periods. Rejecting the concept of the UN as a legal order, he re-
gards it as an instrument of collective diplomacy. Finally, the Dutch
should finally abandon their preoccupation with the colonial issue in
the UN and, "having no foreign policy of their own," might most effec-
tively contribute to world peace and order throug-h the economic and
technical programs of the U. system. This last theme is explored in
more detail below.
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The New Guinea Que st c i
At the Ha TCo in 1949 the Nthorlands nd Indosia a reed to settle
within a year this issuo whch rencinod unroilVed in the process of trans-
ferring sovo reinty over the former Netherlands East Indies. It was not
settled, and it will be recalled that on Indonesian initiative the UN
debated this matter for four years ( h In 1 the Gcneral
Assembly expreSsed hope for the sucess of ne potiations between the
2
Netherlands and Indonesia. The -:xt year an Afro-Asian resolution
establishing a Good Offices Cormission failed to -et a 2/3 vote. In
1957 a proposal invitine the twro parties to resume no,otiations received
41 votes to 29, with 11-including the US-abstainin, but failed because
it did not secure a 2/3 majority. During that debate the Dutch reiterated
their view that "thero could be no question of a transfer of sovereignty...
without consultation of the inhabitants" who, at an "appropriate timo,"
3
would be accorded that right of solf-determination. tut--and it is this
which Indonesia. and her supporters find wholly frustrating-at present,
"with the exception of a very small Croup, the population is incapable of
expressing its political will,
2. General Assembly Resolution 915(X) 16 Dec 1955,
3. General Assembly Official Records, 11th Session, 1st Comittee, 857th
Mtg0, 25 Feb 1957, para. 47.
h. G&oa. 858th rrtg., 25 Feb 1958, para. 13
0 &
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In the last debate held by the UN--1957--Indoneeia just as consistently
maintained that "West Irian" was a part of Indonesia "just as it has been part
and parcel of the Netherlands Indies before the transfer of sovereignty."5
Thus the deadlock continues, and this is the issue which preoccupies the
Netherlands in the UN and which preoccupies many UN members when they think
of Dutch UN policy.
In the Hague, it does not take much probing to arrive at a strikingly
different perspective on the problem.
According to highly reliable information, important elements within the
Government have in recent years urged on the Foreign Minister the notion that
the Dutch should be prepared to accept a trusteeship agreement for West New
Guinea with the administering authority either the Netherlands or the UN itself,
the latter under the still-unused provisions of Article 81 of the Charter.
According to this account, Mr. Luna rejected the proposal but agreed that other
members of the Cabinet might be consulted. This was unsuccessful, presumably
because of Mr. Luns' known disapproval
One highly placed independent observer believes that the present intran-
sigeant Dutch policy rests on support from only a minority at the top of the
Government. Others can be found who agree with this observer's estimate that
a majority in the Dutch parliament would be prepared to vote for a change in
the policy except for a fear of appearing unpatriotic,
Privately expressed Foreign Ministry views acknowledge that the Dutch New
Guinea policy sorely handicaps the Netherlands in its quest for a wider political
role in the UN, They do not acknowledge the existence of acceptable solutions
in the foreseeable future. One high official discussed the case in tones of
5. GAO, 861st Mtg 0 , 27 February 1957, paragraph 3.
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extreme frustration, basing his pessimism on the demonstrated inability of the UN,
in Dutch eyes, to "guarantee the execution of agreements" with Indonesia. This
is of course an echo of persistent grievances, among them the quick Indonesian
substitution of a unitary government for the federation scheme envisaged by the
Hague Round Table Conference in the fall of 1949 at which agreement was reached
for transfer of sovereignty. The degree of discontent with Government policy
should not be exaggerated, although it is real. Many Dutchmen--but certainly
not all--continue to resent deeply Indonesia's "repeated failure" to abide by
international agreements, not to mention more recent Indonesian attacks on
Dutch economic interests (see below).
The issue is by no means closed. Some leaders of the Labor party consider
it to be an international question--precisely the acknowledgment denied by the
Government in UN debate-and that an international solution, short of giving
the territory to Indonesia, should be sought. (In early October 1958, a Labor
motion was introduced in Parliament asking the Government to reconsider its
policy, and inquiring whether a trusteeship solution would be deemed acceptable.
The Government asserted its belief that no such solution would be acceptable to
Indonesia and the motion was withdrawn.) On the other hand, another Labor party
leader, acknowledging that West New Guinea was retained by the Dutch "in order
to get a 2/3 vote" in parliament for the transfer of general sovereignty to
Indonesia, sees no short-term solution and believes Dutch public opinion to be
sharply divided now on the issue. It may well be that the lack of unanimity
within the Labor party on an alternative policy is the greatest single obstacle
to a change in national policy,
A minority party leader stated what appears to be an evident fact in the
Netherlands: Dutch relations with Indonesia are still close and, on the
personal level, good. From this he concluded that the UN can only hinder
still further these relations, exacerbating as it does the political differences.
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But the same individual strongly urged a UN trusteeship for West New Guinea
and estimated that the Government could secure a 2/3 vote in parliament for
any solution except one making an Asian power the Administering Authority
On balance, one can conclude that West New Guinea is not a major issue
in the Netherlands but is by now generally viewed as an incident in Dutch
international relations for which any solution would probably be acceptable,
short of gratifying the desire of Indonesia to acquire this piece of real
estate, Rumors circulating late in 1958 suggest that an alternative arrangement
may be developing with Australia (which administers the remainder of New Guinea
as a UN trusteeship), Under this reported scheme, joint Australian-Dutch de-
velopment programming for the whole of New Guinea will pave the way for
eventual Dutch withdrawal and Australian assumption of responsibility for
the whole island, which will thereby be heading for future existence as a
unified and independent country,
That Dutch retention of the area rests on an almost purely political basis
which could under proper circumstances lend itself to a reasonable solution is
further attested by its negative economic importance. In the period 1954-1956
the Dutch made grants to West New Guinea totalling $50.3 millions, offset
by a $7.1 million excess of loan repayments over new loans0 Indeed, Holland
is still paying heavily for the whole transformation in the Indies. In her speech
from the throne on September 16, 1958, Queen Juliana announced a budget
6, UN Statistical Yearbook, 1957, po 455o
Ill
deficit for 1959 of $347 million, double the previous year ls. She
attributed this financial detorioration primarilr to "developments in
7
Indonesia," developments thich arise from the continuing assault on
Dutch interests in Indonesia carried out under the banner of "West
Irian," and which in 1958 resulted in the loss of $1.25 billion of
Dutch investments and the expulsion of 40,000 Dutch citizens from
8
Indonesia.
This subject should not be dropped without at least a reference to
the other colonial issue in the UN that has helped to shape the picture
the Netherlands holds of the UN-and vice versa, The award of autonomr
to Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles in 1954 ended a chapter of dis-
pute within the UN Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing
Territories--and the General Assembly--centering on the Dutch refusal
since 1951 to transmit information to the UN on the two territories.
The Dutch position had been that the territories were in fact self-
governing in the field of economic, social and educational affairs,
and that the territorial governments were opposed to further reporting
to the Secretary General in these fields. This contention was hotly
disputed by numbers of the anti-colonial members of the U
When the constitutional changes were completed the Netherlands so
reported, and under American and Brazilian sponsorship the General Assembly
7. New York Herald Tribune, Septembor 17, 1958.
8o Figures used by Dutch delegate to UN, New York Times, Oct, 3, 1958
in 1955 passod by a vote of 21 to 10, ith 33 abstentions, a resolution
endorsing the cessation of reportingo This chapter now appears to be
closed.
Economic and Social Interests and the U
tUith a long and honorable history of religious tolerance and the
provision of asylum for political and reliious refugees, the Dutch have
been disproportionately active in the postwar institutions designed to
assist displaced persons and other refugees. The Nethorlands provided
the first tU High ComEissioner for Refugees, in addition to furnishing
continuous financial support for this and other refugee organisationso
In 1957 the Netherlands was one of only four governments contributing
10
cash to the W Refugee Fundo
The other theme has already been adverted to at several points
above. This is the Dutch vision of the W as the agency for the tech-
nical and economic development of underdeveloped countries.
The availability of surplus Dutch technicians who used to vork in
what is now Indonesia provides a thoroughly practical reason for intense
Dutch interest in the tU Technical Assistance programso The statistics of
Dutch contribution to tN voluntary programs show that whatever the reasons,
the Dutch have carried more than their shareo In the period 1954-a1956 Dutch
contributions to the MI Expanded Program of Technical Assistance were the
9o See T Participation in the W, Report by the President to the Congess
1955, Department of State Publication 6318, Yashington, D*0G, 1956o Po l191o
10o GAOR, 13th Session, Supplement 60 M Doc. A 3834
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highest of any European country except France and the UK and were 2/3
of the Soviet contribution. The Dutch contribution to the UN Child.
ren's Fund was exceeded in Europe only by France, Sweden, and the UK;
the total of Dutch voluntary contributions was surpassed only by those
of the big two in Europe,11 In 1957 the Dutch contribution to UNTAP
was $974,000, the sixth highest among the entire UN membership and
12
exceeded only by Canada, France, the USSR, the UK, and the US.
Dutch motivations in this field are both powerful and varied, For
one thing, the Dutch economy is, roughly, 50% dependent on foreign trade,
For another, it is virtually impossible for a country of this size to
maintain the necessary machinery of its own to operate bilateral programs;
virtually all available funds would go for overhead. The Netherlands
experienced great difficulty in estimating correctly the size of its
Pakistan program (originally 2 million guldens, eventually 1} million
more in order to complete it) and as a result decided not to start any
new bilateral programs0 The availability of skilled technicians has
already been mentioned. And a final source of motivation which should
never be underrated derives from powerful religious and ethical impulses
which find satisfaction not only in sponsoring aid but in favoring the
use of multilateral channels to the greatest extent possible,
In recent years the Dutch have moved out ahead in a highly contro-
versial direction: support of SUNFED--the long-proposed Special UN
Fund for Economic Development-despite the continuing opposition of such
a Fund's foremost prospective contributor-the United Stateso
11. UN Statistical Yearbook, 1957, P. 458,
12. US Participation in the UN, Report by the President to the Congress
for the Year 1957, State Department Publication 6654 (Washington:
GPO, 1958), ppo 274-5o
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The Dutch see a large-scale UN program of developmental financing
as perhaps the major contribution the organization can make to the im-
provement of conditions in the underdeveloped area and, ex hypothesi,
to the denial of the neutral areas to communism. There is no partisan-
ship evident in this position, and the Government has vigorously pursued
its objective. At the 1957 summer session of the UN Economic and Social
Council the Dutch were among the strongest proponents of a resolution
urging the Assembly to establish SUNFED immediately and to set up a
preparatory committee to work out the practical details,13 In 1958 the
Dutch sought to use the Special Technical Assistance fund voted the pre-
13o See ECOSOC Resolution 662B (XXIV), 31 July, 1957.
vious fall-the Anerican tubstite for $1>-E-to gain experionce
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"useful to a future financing or tar confornin t-o the SUWFED plan."
They wore defeated when the preparatory Cor'ittee adopted a more con-
sorvative course advocated by the United States oThere is an unconfirm-
ed report that the Dutch Government was recently on the verge of at-
tempting to bring the situation to a head by actually putting up a very
substantial sum of money, a move desi-;ned at least in part to show the
United States that it would not necessarily be the sole large contrib-
utor, According to this report, the plan was finally vetoed on the
grounds that it would be a futile -sture in the face of unyielding
American opposition to the whole SUNED, scheoeo
In any event, Dutch Government officials are now taking heart from
si jns of greater multilateral aid. The Labor Party, of course, goes
well beyond this view and vigorously advocates an exclusively multi-
lateral approach, According to two of its leading figures, the whole
contemporary notion of large-scale bilateral aid is an "American mis-
take" which now is going to make it possible for "the Russians to out-
bid us.At Taking as premise the ur gency of strengthening Western re-
lations with Asia, one such spokesman sees multilateral aid as a means
of taking the economic issue "out of the Cold War 01' Another advocates
basing such aid on purely technical rather than political guarantees.
Even those Dutch politicians and other loaders who can see some good in
11 UN Doc. A/Ac093/L0 8, h March 1958.
certain typos of hi,4 kjla ;ar: se o P 0h A uliteral variety
for these reasons and becauso "rosentmonts r lss," "problems of sov-
ereinty do not arise," and "it devolops a sen of conrion responsibility."
Traditionally efficiont, the Dutch could e exnocte to insist with equal
fervor on effective and oconomicil adiiniatration and controls in wrhat-
ever type of internaational pronranm may devolop.
Dutch SecuritThe 1, and the JJN
Dutch leaders a3ree that their country is today completely depend-
ent on NATO althoui they believe the UN can "maintain order" in the
Uiddle East. The interest In NATO is far from 3rudging, as it is in
some othor Western European countries. IATO is "vital for Dutch security"
but more than this, it "brings the U.S, close." Great pride -oes into
the assertion that in Europe the Dutch are "the only ones fulfilling
their NATO commitments,9" 'Tough" on communism, 'he Dutch offer little
support for the kinds of disengagement plans 80 far advanced, and one
frequently hears criticism of President Eisenhower for "going too far"
at Geneva in 1955
The security picture should be viend in the light of ani inson-
trovortible and, for zn Ameirican-, rather refrcsining fact: Holland is
certainly the most pro-American nation in Europe today, whether be-
cause of obvious similarities of national character, or by association,
as it were, with the British who, to many Dutchmen, are their "fsllo.:
Anglo-Saxons." But even in the Netherlands there appears to be growing
resentment at some aspects of American culture and politics- Mr. Dullos
is disliked, but also admired and trusted for his "cleverness" vis-a.-Vis
the Soviet Union, The US3, particularly in nore conservative circles,
V &
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is achildish" in its grrations on colonial issues in the TW.c Such cir-
cles feel that *colonial* is not necessarily a bad word. And at loast
in June 1958, there appeared to be nothing short of unanimity that Cort-
munint China should be seated in the Wo
Senior government officials confess that their continuing vote for
a moratorium on the question of seating Communist China in the II has
been a concession to the U.S o and does not reflect genuine Dutch feeling
The Netherlands so voted once again on September 23, 1958. The apparent
internal compromise is to seek to develop the closest possible economic
relations with Peiping but to follow the policy of the dominant Western
ally in the political arenao
For estorn Europe, Sues was a painful test of conflicting loyal-
ties* For the Dutch the problem was considerably less. Basically pro-
British, "as the only Anglo-Saxons on the Continent," the Dutch have
also been outspokenly pro-Israel in considering Near Eastern issues,
an orientation which ore observer attributed largely to the close iden.-
tity the Dutch Reformed Church feels with ancient Jewr7 and the Old
Testament. Whatever the reason, this bias has undoubtedly hurt the
Dutch, (as it has hurt the Americans), in their attempts to cooperate
with the Arab powers. There seems little argument in the Netherlands
with the proposition that Secretary General Hamarskjold has been "too
progyptian" in the recent Near Eastern crises, and again, one must
weigh the effect of this attitude against the Dutch urge to better
Western relations with the Arab-Asian grouping, primarily through eco-
nomic manso It is apparent that even if West New Guinea should be--
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come neutralized as a political obstacle to Dutch-Arab-Asian relations,
Dutch Middle East policy will still carry some painful dilemmas.
A number of the themes referred to above converge in the views of
responsible Dutch leaders regarding the European movement. As suggested
at the outset, no country offers more uniformly enthusiastic support for
European integration than the Netherlands.
Government policy is quite unequivocal on this score but does not
appear to make the sort of sharp connections--or contrasts--between com-
mitments to "Europe" and those regarding the UN which one finds else-
where. One leading politician, however, sees a stronger Europe as speci.
fically strengthening the Dutch position in the UN, Another reported that
a prime world figure from one of the Arab states recently told him that
the Middle East is waiting eagerly for Europe to "come back," not as
individual countries but as "Europe." Yet this same Dutch personage
believes that, in the overall, it is the UN and not Europe that can
provide the fruitful across-the-board contacts with the underdeveloped
countries on which future free world relationships will strongly depend.
The Future
Dutch public opinion, like public opinion throughout the Western
community, is basically indifferent to the UN. The average Dutchman is
perhaps annoyed by what seems to him the UN's role in relieving the
Netherlands of her East Indies and the treasure and prestige attaching
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thereto., This is a fairly unhlstorie view, and more seriousness accom-
panies criticism of the ON as a "haven for trresponsible nationalism,"
again a common theme among the volonial administering powers of Western
Europe,.
At the same time there is, as indlicated, aicute interest throughout
the country in those UN programs whib seem to represent practical so-
lutions to problems of special interest to the Netherlands-problems
of refugees, technical assistance and, now, the financing of economic
development in the underdeveloped countries,
There are other themes in the Dutch forward estimate of the UN s
values to the Netherlands and the West , The UT, :a is felt, can and
should play a decisive role in certain-but not a L- aspects of the
political and propaganda struggle, Dutch planners and political leaders
seem agreed that in the cold war the UN can do far more for the West if
only we would develop better, more sophisticated tactics., (This is also
a theme of which Italian leaders are acutely mindful,) The Chinese repre-
sentation problem is obviously not far from their thoughts.
In addition, some spokesmen look ahead to greater and more defini-
tive UN involvement in the Middle East,, in Kashmir, and in other disputes
within the non-communist world. There is no great hope for the success
of disarmament negotiations within the UN, and even on the Labor Party
side there are urgent suggestions for more NATO consultations- meaning
specifically with the US--with a view to forming common Western policies
toward UN issues particularly in regard to colonial questions This is
of course an oblique reference to the US habit of abstaining in the V
0 0
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on the issue of New Guinea as well as the new US policy of aid to
Indonesia.
But the chief thrust of Dutch policy, as it regards the UN, comes
back to the economic potential0 If the UN can do far better by us in
the Cold War, if "better Western tactics" are needed, this means above
all a concerted Western approach to neutral and underdeveloped countries
through the medium most of these countries favor--the UN--by means of
a new, bold, large-scale program of multilateral economic development
financing. Many Dutchmen put this issue on the same plane as questions
of war or peace.
In the summer of 1953 the Netherlands became the first government
to pronounce itself formally on the subject of a general conference to
review the UN Charter, a matter which according to Article 109 was to
be debated by the Assembly two years later, The Dutch set up a Nation-
al Commission consisting of distinguished citizens in and out of the
government to study the problem and make recommendations,
When the US sought, later in the same summer of 1953, to stimulate
widespread national and international attention to the problem of Charter
Review, the Dutch were already hard at work (and already had some reser.
vations about the prospects for success). Before very long, while the
Department of State was still, so to speak, circling in the orbit in
which Mr. Dulles' initial thrust had--against the judgment of some of
his advisors--propelled it, those leading the Dutch review had con-
cluded that nothing would come of it at this particular stage of history.
Their efforts have thus turned to other projects for enhancing the pros.
pects for world comrunity arid for ;reat er *;css in the East t con-
flict, largely by the use of avail-able UN nac.inory, however imperfocto
If the issue of West New Guinea were to be olixinated as a factor for
tropia in the Dutch vision of the UN, there seems little doubt that an
even hi-ter order of analysis and ima-ination about the constructive and
profitable usos of the UN midrit be anticipated from the Netherlands.
THE CONTEMPORARY WEST GERMAN VTEW OF THE UN
introduction
The Federal Republic of Germany is not a member of the United Nations,
It is, however, the most important Western state to remain outside the doors
of that organization, The likelihood is that Western Germanywill remain
outside so long as two parts of that country, like Korea and Vietnam, lie
on opposite sides of the de facto truce line between East and West. But
the German presence in Western diplomacy is being increasingly felt. Its
economic potential and performance have once again won for it a leading
place in the European economy; and its foreign policy orientation must con-
tinue to be a matter of the most acute concern to the United States, to Europe,
and to world peace0
This brief inquiry was made on the assumption that, despite Germany's
absence from UN councils, any survey of the Western European outlook regard-
ing the United Nations would be incomplete without some reference to the
Federal Republic, In the retrospect of a brief investigation of the contem-
porary German view of the United Nations, this premise appears to have been
well-founded,
German Membership in International Organizations
The Federal Republic of Germany is today a member of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the
European Payments Union, the Western European Union, the European Coal and
* Henceforth referred to as Germany.
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Steel Community, the Council of Europe, ar the UN Economic Commission for
Europe, In addition, it is a member of the new European Economic Community-
the Common Market--as well as the European Atomic Energy Community--EURATOM,
In addition, however, Germany is a member of all of the specialized
agencies of the United Nations and maintains an observer at the seat of the
United Nations in New York. German participation in the United Nations pr-
per is two-fold,, In the first place one might put the activities of the
German observer in the corridors of the United Nations and in other diploma-
tic settings in New York, The German Foreign Ministry values highly
the fact that its observer mission is on good terms with the United Nations
Secretariat and plays an active part in affairs in New York. The other major
aspect of participation takes the form of financial contributions to the
budgets of the voluntary programs of the United Nations,, Here again German
officials take pride in the fact that their country is contributing "in every
way it can" short of being a member of the United Nations, and follows the
policy of attempting to increase its contributions each year,
The contributions made by Germany to UN technical assistance and relief
agencies tend to support this attitude (although the actual dollar amounts
are perhaps smaller than German pride in them would seem to warrant.) In
the period 19541956, the German contribution to the UN expanded program for
technical assistance (UNETAP), compared with the contributions of members of
the United Nations, was as great as that of Turkey and greater than Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Yugoslavia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Japan,
Its contribution to the ordinary technical assistance fund (UNTA) was greater
than that of Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands,. Norway, and Sweden, and
its grant to UNICEF was twice that of Belgium and the same as the contributio.n
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made by Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and New Zealando In 1957 Oemany s
contribution to the UN programk of technical assistance was 12th among a list
2
of 84 contributing nations, (In July of that year Germany subscribed a
further 100 million to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment,)3
In Bonn one hears the statement that Germany might make a far greater
contribution to multilateral economic development and other programs out of
its foreign currency reserves4 An interesting debate centers around the
actual availability of this reserve (see below), and the writer is not quali-
fied to evaluate the merits on either side. A more self-evident argument
for continued modesty in German international financial efforts would seem to
arise from the refugee situation, The Federal Republic is still receiving a
quarter of a million refugees each year from East Germany, and the problem
of adequate housing, despite large-scale building programs, remains entirely
acute and tends to color the morale and sense of well-being of both the man
in the street and government officials alike,
GermaAttitudes Regarding the United Nations
The recently appointed German permanent observer to the United Nations
said upon his arrival in New York on August 23, 1958: "The German people
place their hope in the United Nations "' Senior Foreign Office officials
insist upon the great importance to Germany of a strengthened United Nations,
based on the assumption tha t the UN can be "nothing but useful" to Germany,
T UN Satietical Yearbook1957, Po .458.
2, Report by the President to the Coresas on US Participation in the UN, 1957,
p.- 274 2 75
3. World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1958 (New York: New York World Telegram
and Sun, 19387.
4, Dr, Werner Dankwort as quoted in New York Times, August 24, 1958,
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particularly in its capacity to illuminate the Western positions in the cold
war, (On this count both German and Italian officials are strikingly preoc-
cupied with the possibilities of using the United Nations for propaganda pur-
poses, They assert frankly the view that their senior Western partners are
wasting admirable propaganda opportunities which arise continuously in the
United Nations to create a better popular international image of Western policy,
Since both countries were innovators in modern propaganda theories and techniques
this emphasis is not surprising. It does, however, imply a danger of clouding
their judgment on the possibility of serious negotiations and programs in the
United Nations, a danger not unfamiliar in some similarly unbalanced American
approaches.
Another clue to the kind of interest which the United Nations arouses in
Germany may be found in the relatively strong position of the German UN Associa-
tion, which, unlike some of its counterparts in other Western European countries,
appears to be quite active. Officials of both the German government and the
Bundestag go out of their way to deny the existence of any real opposition to the
United Nations in Germany and stress the fact that the young people have become
"far more politically-minded" and are strong supporters of the United Nations in
consequence. This is taken as a most hopeful sign since, as they frankly state,
the relative apathy and ignorance of German youth helped to pave the way for i
(Othei observers, howover, believe that German youth Ias more politically
during the Weimar period than since 1945, and that the present generation., more
matter-of-fact and less susceptible to ideological concepts, is as a consequer
more sympathetic to international organizations.)
One parliamentarian who is extremely active in the UN Association an spe
throughout the country on this and related subjects says she receives extraor,. ,
intelligent and interested questions on her speaking tours, particularly from
student and worker groups. (Tt might be of interest to survey the membership of
UN Associations in various countries including the United States, classified on
the baois ,f ge, economic and social
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standing in the community, etc, The interest and participation of students
and workers in Germany would seem to present a strikingly different picture
than the one we are familiar with in the United States.)
These relatively optimistic and positive indications of public interest
and support obviously do not represent a reliably significant sampling of
national opinion, The Washington correspondent of an influential German week-
ly recently wrote that since the United Nations has tended to become an in,
stitution of power politics "this situation does not seem to open promis-
ing possibilities for Germany so much as to carry new threats,," It can be
assumed that hostility to the United Nations can also be found in some m-ore
conservative quarters in Germany as well as in circles which favor a more
belligerent policy toward the Soviet Union and the Communist world,
On purely objective grounds one must conclude that, as one high official
put it, the UN "seems distant to Germany,," As in other Western European
countries, the young people of Germany have been far more deeply gripped by
the appeal of the European movement (although as the possibilities of poli-
tical integration seemed recently to recede, a wave of disillusionment appeared
to be setting in,)
Differences of opinion between the major political parties is revealed
specifically in attitudes toward concrete matters such as reunification and
relations with the Middle East (see below), But the general impression of
partisanship on this score seems comparable to that experienced in several
other Western European countries, where differences are a matter of shading
or degree rather than being of a more fundamental nature,, Social Democratic
(SPD) leaders portray themselves as "more progressive" toward the United Na-
tions than the dominant Christian Democrats (CDU)Y One high government
Claus Jacobi, "German Paradoxes" 3435 Foreign Affairs (1957).,
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official suggested that the SPD tends to emphasize the United Nations as a
Upolitical device" while the government realistically concentrates its energies
on N.ATO., Another government officialp denying that there is any substantive
difference between the parties, suggested that the SPD is "more active" on the
subject of the UN because it is not so busy.
But the differences may not be entirely nonexistent, and German views of
the UN could well be affected by the future complexion of the German government,,
On this score, Adenauer's victory in the 1957 general election assures the
CDU/CSU some fairly long-term prospects, with little likelihood of another
general election before 1961, Few Germans are willing to predict an SPD victory
in the foreseeable future. It seems generally acknowledged that the party lacks
strong leadership and tends to be dominated by doctrinaire socialists. In any
event, a number of independent observers believe that if the SPD did win office
it would promptly forget its current doctrines on such subjects as disengagement
and neutralism,
The 1959 crisis over Berlin had the effect of stiffening West German oppo-
sition to recognition of the East German regime in any form and to softening
of the Western position that bases reunification exclusively on free elections
in East Germany. Before the new Soviet move in 1958, some important members
of the CDU were beginning to question the "rigidity" of governmental policy
on the subject of reunification as well as in other areas which might have a
bearing on the general German outlook toward the United States, the United
Nations, and Western Europe, At the moment German foreign policy is so domi-
nated by the personality and will of Chancellor Adenauer that it is not easy
to envisage the kinds of changes in policy, if any, which would be made by
his successors (among whom the names Erhard and Gerstenmaier seem to stand out),
The basic themes involved in German attitudes toward the United Nations
are two-the United Nations and the problem of reunification, and the United
Nations and relationships with the neutralist and underdeveloped countries,
The significance of German relations with the United Nations emerges most
sharply under these two headings.
The United Nations and the Problem of Reunification
The problem of reunification lies, of course, at the heart of the German
foreign policy ensemble today In German eyes it is the acid test for such
schemes for "disengagement" and neutralization of Germany as the now-modified
Rapacki plan, and is at the center of the whole range of issues arising from
relations with the Soviet Union and with the West. The preponderant position
within the government, reflecting the current policies being followed by
Chancellor Adenauer, flatly discourages consideration of proposals for neutral-
ization and, consequently, disengagement, Whatelver may be hoped for, Ger.
many in this view is simply too big and too significant in the European scheme
of things ever to be "neutral." Government officials appear to be realistic
about the Soviet Union and its power, and their attitudes coincide with the
common lines of policy followed by both administrations in the United States
toward this issue. In this sense, official German policy favors the present
status quo pending some evolution (or revolution) which would drastically change
the bases of the power relationship, (On the other hand, Rapallo and the Nazi=
Soviet pact should never be entirely forgotten by the West, particularly when
the Soviet Union chooses to display its recollection of this history0 6 )
6, See Walter Lippmanngs interview with Premier Khrushchev reported in New York
Herald Tribune, November 10, 1958.
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Other Germans, particularly within SPD circles, do not necessarily go along
with the present policy, One highly placed independent observer believes that
"1the ice is cracking under the surface," and that if only more men of finesse
and imagination were brought into the circles of power-probably only after
Adenauer departs the scene--a new position might be formulated which reflects
'true German interests" rather than general Western interests, In this view,
Germany is "too agreeable," "too anxious not to cause trouble.' The possibili-
ties of unification appear to be hopeless only because the Western position is
so "rigid." Reunification will come about only through a long-term disengagement
action without conditions, and which involves other evolutions within the Soviet
orbit, The West should, it is felt, have made a prompt counterproposal to the
Polish Foreign Minister when he made his original proposal for disengagement
in the fall of 1957, It is fair to say that the above represents the view
generally held by German intellectuals,
On the other hand, highly placed government spokesmen see little realistic
possibility for the achievement of German objectives of unification and genuine
security so long as the Western position depends upon free elections. The
United States has hinted at a modification of this position, but in the view
of the dominant German personalities there should be absolutely no "give" on
this, For all the talk about reunification, West Germany obviously chooses a
divided Germany over a unified one vulnerable to Communist penetration, unpro-
tected by the West, or barred from exercising freedom of choice in selecting her
friends,
Germans are rarely explicit about this and prefer to base their case on the
rationale that if Germany goes, the free world is lost and therefore the present
7, In Secretary of State Dulles' news conference January 13, 1959, reported
in New York Times, January 14, 1959,
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German position must be the basis for Western policy. One is struck here,
as elsewhere in the German scene, by the implicit egotism of German policy
n the keen sense of the potential political leverage the importance of Germany
to the West might one day afford to German diplomacy. Nowhere articulated, this
at&itude may well be expected to become more overt with the passage of time
(ast it has tended to become again explicit in the other once-great continental
powe'r=-Franc-e)o
Senior )overnment Fpokesmen refer to the United Nations in this connection
in two ways, First, a United Nations army might conceivably provide security
by replacing the present British, American (and theoretically French) forces,
But until the time when this is a genuine possibility, the status guo must be
preserved, While the Soviet Union has rather surprisingly suggestcd a UN prsnce
in the proposed "free city" of Berlin, Soviet policy in general defines the
lilmits of any use of the UN as an instrument for changing the status go in
Germany in ways which would leave Germany free to rearm and to be allied with
the NATO powerse
The United Nations also has become involved in the past, abortively, in
the Gercman reunification problem, and may well again. (It will be recalled that,
,n Gerian iriative, the three Western Powers brought to the 1951 General Assembly
ses:sion a request for the appoint-ment of an impartial international commission
under UN supervision to carry out a simultaneous investigation in both parts of
Germany to d.termine whether conditions existed for the holding of genuinely
frc elections, The Assembly adopted a resolution establishing a commission
composed of representatives of Brazil, Iceland, the Netherlands, Pakistan,, and
Poland 29 Although the Western part of Germany was of course open to the
The curisnt bacis for policy is contained in the Berlin Declaration,
Federal Republic of Germany, France, UK and US, Juiy 29, 7 7f('!epertment
of Statc Press Rolease #35, July 29, 1957)4
9 s neral Assembl Reltio 10 (VI) of 20 De 1951
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commission, it was barred from the Soviet zone in Germany and concluded
that there was little prospect of being able to pursue its task.) In
the opinion of some Foreign Ministry officials, Western Germany is "helped"
every time the question of unification is discussed in the United Nations,
and unquestionably the Germans find it convenient to have others willing
to represent German policies before a world-wide audience, But some of the
same officials see great risk in extending such debates to the details of
reunification; the great danger is that the bedrock issue of free elections
will be confused and blurred by the intervention of neutralists with schemes
for "bridging the gap." Thus, while assertions of the Western position are
welcomed, United Nations intervention in the matter of reunification and in-
deed in any issue affecting German security is believed to be extremely dan.
gerous to both German and Western interests,, The Germans are naturally
alarmed at the prospect of debate i4 the United Nations on reunification with
Germany unable to take part in such debates without Western agreement to com-
parable participation by the German Democratic Republic, In such a situation
the West Germans tend to display uncertainty as to the attitudes of the Asian
African group and are in general dubious about the value to Germany of any
conceivable action by the United Nations, Almost as an afterthought, some of
these officials throw in the suggestion that it would be most unhealthy for
the United Nations itself to take on another insoluble problem, Again, de-
velopments with respect to the status of Berlin could conceivably force a
reappraisal of this view. If the Soviet Union repudiates the Potsdam Agreement,
the West may face a choice between direct negotiations with the GDR, or seeking
political modalities through the United Nations for continuation of the present
multinational regime for Berlin0
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Relations with Asian-African Countries
This is the other paramount issue that arises in connection with German
"nonparticipatiod'in the United Nations, and here the lines are rather sharply
drawn, One side--which includes a number of government people--expresses
private satisfaction with the considerable advantages Germany derives from
her present position as a non-Member, These advantages are obvious: Germany,
unlike her Western European and American allies, is not forced to choose pub.
licly between Europe and the Asian-African bloc on the many issues where this
choice arises in the United Nations,,, Gertany can thus be "neutral," and can
stand aside, helping out where it appears possible, particularly on questions
arising out of colonial issues or bearing on relations between European coun-
tries and their former colonies, The German observer can thus "do a great
deal for the free world behind the scenes." As with a number of other German
positions, the current policy is felt to be both "easier" for Germany and also
working to the advantage of the larger alliance and Western community as a
whole,
The other side of the argument holds that the advantages of nonparticipa-
tion for Germany are exaggerated and carry a taint of imniorality While it
is better to have no Germany in the United Nations than to have two Germanies,
Germany, in this view, should be "courageous' enought to take stands on issues
that arise in the United Nations even as among friends
The rather peripheral nature of the relationship between the United Nations
and the politically urgent questions of reunification, Genan security, and
relationships with allies and with the Arab world (see below) go a long way to
explain why, in the words of one rather cynical high official of the German
Press Ministry, the United Nations seems terribly distant to Germany. It also
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makes it possible for an equally high official in the Foreign Ministry to
claim that the German attitude toward the United Nations is extremely "posi=
tive," He asserted that while both bilateral and multilateral approaches
to political and economic problems are necessary, the multilateral approach
is vitals above all in the role which the Secretary General can play in pro-
viding a mediatory element between otherwise irreconcilable sides in the kinds
of conflicts the world confronts today,
Germany, the United Nations, and the Underdeveloped Countries
Germany sees herself as allied to her Western European partners but
at the same time occupying a different category so far as colonial issues
are concerned, This distinction has two roots, In terms of colonies9,Germany
is once again in a "'have-not" kind of position compared with Britain, France,
(and the United States,) This time, instead of agitating for the return of her
overseas colonies--as -he did in the inter-war years, Germany is ex.
ploiting her new "have-not" status, much as the Italians are currently doing,
and hoping for the rewards that such political continence deserves0 Germany
is also the loser of a war only thirteen years ago in which its partners were
the victors It is not strange that some of the criteria which responsible
Germans set up to judge international political actions tend to differ from
those elsewhere in the Western alliance. In the view of some reputable Ger.
mans, the United States was the only country that lived up to the standards
of the UN Charter in the Suez episodeo At the time of Suez the German govern-
ment itself may have been unwilling to say anything in public against the French
and the British, butsaccording to Germang today the general public, and particu=
larly the students, were highly indignant at the "immoral" action of their pri-
mary Western partnerso
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This could of course be explained in psychological terms of the moral
virtue of the former sinner who has hit the sawdust trail, But as a political
fact it has profound significance, particularly as Germany looks out to the
South over the heads of her European partners. The Middle East is once again
a target of serious German attention (as it is of that other purged pariah in
the NATO camp--Italy). As though it needed to be justified, German activity
in the Middle East is characterized by some German officials as based upon
the fear that, in the absence of an energetic policy, the Egyptians and other
Arabs would do business with the German Democratic Republic which also has
technicians and know-how. Obviously the German interest in world-wide mar-
kets for her manufactured goods has an important place in the equation, The
seriousness which Germany attaches to its Middle Eastern policy today provides
at least a partial explanation for German official resentment over British
and French "stupidity" in trying to turn the clock back in the fall of 1956"
The same irritation with this outmoded way of doing business with the Arabs
was also apparent in the early summer of 1958 in connection with the American
and British landings in Lebanon and Jordan: perhaps no Western European country
was as openly critical in its press as Germany.
It is against this background that the German approach to the underdeveloped
countries of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East should be viewed, Some leading
figures in the Foreign Ministry insist that Germany's interest in the under-
developed countries is not essentially a "commercial" problem and that Germany
does not need markets, but is really "acting for the West" from her highly favor.
able position as a country recently "defeated by the colonial power's,," Thus
unencumbered by the colonial incubus, Germany is in a position to rebuild the
bridges between North and South which have been shattered or are now hanging
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by 'a thread, Whatever the motives, Germany "feels strongly" the need to make
as large as possible a contribution to the economic development of the under-
developed countries. A fund of 50 million Deutschmark has been set up for
bilateral programs, and it is now reported from Bonn that $100 millions is
to be diverted from the domestic reconstruction field to the financing of
capital goods exports to underdeveloped lands,10 Current policy is to press
for better political coordination by NATO in order to enable the representa-
tives of the OEEC member countries to coordinate their economic activities,
But some officials feel strongly that while NATO may be useful to firm up
political objectives, it is not useful as an instrument for aid (as was pro-
posed by the French government a few years ago0 ) Rather, the United Nations
(or alternatively, the OEEC) is seen as the most fruitful vehicle for convey-
ing Western aid to the underdevelopeds, particularly in allaying the suspicions
of recipient countries,
Here the foreign exchange reserve, cited by some as adding up to 30
b.illion Deutschmark, is a key issue. As indicated above, one side suggests that
since there are "no savings" in Germany, the reserves would have to be replaced
if used for economic development, The other side challenges the point of view
that sees Germany as a poor country with recovery only in the industrial sector,
and even within the government it is privately suggested that Germany could
contribute far more heavily than it has so far to multilateral programs, rais-
ing the additional sums from banks, floating public loans, etc, An SPD Deputy
suggested that at least his party would make better use of the currency reserves,
whether they could actually be expended in this way or not, and by
10o See dispatch in New York Times, August 16, 1958.
nationalizing industry or through some other undisclosed measure of economy
could make significantly more funds available for foreign aid,
Perhaps the most perceptive journalist consulted, one who is often called
the "Walter Lippmann of Germany," acknowledged that the idea of greater econo-
mic aid was indeed growing in Germany but that it rested on a far more stra.
tegic basis than the one comionly advanced, The fundamental question about
Africa in the German mind is whether French policy will undermine the chances
for successful future relationships, (This was prior to the fall elections
in 1958 in which France's African territories, except for Algeria, were given
the option of immediate independence,) Germany, said this observer, does not
want to be in the position of "financing French colonialism"; so long as there
is genuine uncertainty about where French policy may be taking the West in
Africa, Germany will "hold back," (The French idea of a "EurAfrica" in rela-
tionship with the Common Market is, he insisted, not popular in Germany.)
Conclusion
It can be readily seen that the United Nations plays only a secondary
role in German thinking, partly because Germany is not a member of the organi..
zation, but also because one of her overriding preoccupations-the cluster of
issues around unification and German security;does not seem to lend itself
to adjudication or any other form of settlement within the United Nations barring
a profound change in Soviet policy (or, as indicated, perhaps in Western policy
too), Again, one must interject a 'caveat in the face of new communist challenges
to the Western position in Berlin , On the other hand, the second
preoccupation=-relations with the Middle East and underdeveloped countries in
general-has a direct bearing on the United Nations and its capabil.ties; the
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Germans are making use of existing UN machinery and many of them would like
to see it used to a considerably greater extent,
The United Nations is seen as a possibly significant means to assist
in the achievement of the German objective of reaching out, over the heads
of its European allies if necessary, to the world to the South where visions
are today arising of renewed German prestige and renewed German markets for
her future productive outpute, Those who take the United Nations seriously-
and there seem to be a surprising number of Germans, particularly among the
young people, who have pinned their flag to this nast-see equally wel. that
in the absence of German membership,and given Germany's continued dependence
upon American military aid for her own security, the future not only of Ger.
many but of the United Nations depends upon the capacity of the United States
to keep the free world together and to add to the strength of that free world
a significant portion of the now neutral and underdeveloped areas of the world,
The dual possibilities of a wholly independent German policy toward the latter,
disassociating herself from the West in order to gain an advantageous national
position, oz of a new Rapallo with the Soviet Union, are today clouds no big.
11
ger than a man's hand, But any Western policy that chose to ignore either
would be fatuous, The United Nations is today important to Germany primarily
on the first count-for the additional avenues it provides toward the achieve.
ment of better relations with the underdeveloped countries, The legitimacy
of this policy can hardly be challenged, But American interests and indeed
Western interests as a whole could conceivably benefit if Germany's partners
themselves collectively or even individually matched the vigor and insight
which this particular German policy reflects,
Ie ome erican observers were quick to note the absence of priority for
free elections in Chancellor Adenauer s reply of November 17, 1958 to
Soviet proposals on peace treaty &.scussion. See New York Herald Tribune,
November 18, 1958,
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THE CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN VIEW OF THE UN
Introduction
In taking the Italian outlook as a part of the general Western
European view of the United Nations, two rather basic provisos need to
be made.
First, Italy became a member of the United Nations in December
1955. The comnonly-heard reference to the "first decade of the UN" in-
volves a major segment of modern diplomatic and political history from
which Italy, except on gh occasions, I was totally excluded.
Secondly, Italy, taken as one of the European "six" plus Britain,
is a case apart in ways that transcend the particular differences in
policy and outlook between, say, France and the United Kingdom, or Belgium
and the Netherlands. The Italian difference rests largely on economic
grounds, but these are of such an order that a foreign policy is in a real
sense still a luxury for postwar Italy. Italy is a "half-developed"
country and, as such, faces economic and social problems of the first
magnitude.
The Italian economy today is making great strides forward, Real
national income rose over 5% a year from 1950 to 1957. Industrial produc-
tion rose by 45% between 1953 and May 1958. Italy's gold and dollar
On February 22, 1951 Italy became a participant of the Trusteeship Council
without vote by virtue of her role as Administering Power in Somaliland
under the Trusteeship Agreement approved by the General Assembly December
2, 1950. The Trusteeship Council revised its rules of procedure to
enable Italy, as a nonmember, to designate a representative and take
part on a limited basis.
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reserves are well ahead of Francels.2 Major efforts are underway to reduce
the sharp economic disparity between the depressed agricultural South and
the industrialized North, But a few statistics are suggestive of the remain-
ing problem: In 1956 per capita energy consumption in the UK was 5.03 metric
tons of coal; in Belgium and Luxembourg it was 4.34; in Italy it was ll2.3
Infant mortality rates in 1955 were 201 deaths per thousand in the Netherlands
and 25.7 in Britain; in Italy: 48.6.4 Current literacy figures are not
available for Italy, but per capita news print consumption in 1956 was 3,6 kge
for Italy, while it was 19 kg, in the UK and 10,2 in Franceo5
It is thus clear that Italian diplomacy and policy toward the rest
of the world through the UN needs to be refracted through the glass of
domestic problems and internal attitudes in the search for clues that might
illuminate the future. Neither the record of past performance in the UN-
in this case negligible-nor the comfortable stereotype of a common "Western"
mentality. drawn only too often in the American image 3upplies the insights
we seeko
The Italian World View
Baron Sonnino, one-time Italian Foreign Minister, adopted for himself
and Italy the motto Alliis licet: tibe non licet--others may: you may not.
2 See dispatch in New York Times, October 5, 1958o
UN Statistical Yearbook, 1957, po 322.
Ibid., p. 38.
.Ibid., p. 633.
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This self-denying ordinance has again limited Italian freedom of policy in
the period since World War 11. And it is the new impatience with such a
policy of restraint that forms one of the themes of relevance to this exami-
nation,
Italy is in transition and is today questioning, if not actually reject-
ing, what some Italian leaders now call the "old shell" of the postwar de
Gasperi policy. The postwar period has ended and such a policy is, to some
influential policy makers, "outdated and insufficient." One turning point
may well have been the elections of May 25-26, 1958, in which the Christian
Democrats retained their power but only as part of at least a moderate left-
ward shift in which the Italian Socialist Party gained nine additional seats
in parliament while the rightist parties moved toward oblivion.
The leftist and activist inclinations of President Gronchi have frequently
been remarked on abroad. They were recently supplied a powerful catalyst in
the person of Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, and today, even more than
before, estimates of the new Italian "dynamism" tend to be personalizedo
But the dynamic forces that may be moving Italy toward a greater national-
istic quality in her policy run deeper than personalities. Italy has recovered
sufficiently from the disasters of the last war to be looking once again for
a role in the world. The men in power are, in this view, expressions
of the times and of the national mood. The dangers of neo-nationalism may
well lie in attempts by the Italian government to interpret this new discon-
tent by over-reacting against Italy's previous "subservience" to Western
policies0 Italy may have been "cut down to size" by the war and "re-educated"
to international cooperation, but the new signs of national confidence and
impatience concern more than one thoughtful Italian when he speculates on
the directions in which the nation may be led by a new ferment of natiOnal-
ism,
Another relevant theme has to do with tensions within the Western
alliance- Italian feelings toward France are historically ambivalent, c i 1
foreign policy is generally aimed at supporting France as a counterweight kv
growing German strength within the alliance, and this is particularly tru
with respect to the Common Market. At the same time, the accessior of
de Gaulle in the late spring of 1958 gave many Italians pause- (Some fee thoi
Fanfani gained a majority only as a result of the Liberal Party's loss of
strength in the light of the Gaullist coup.) A former Italian Defense
Minister, in listing to this writer his version of contemporary dangers,
started with the "Napoleonic phase" of Russian aggression and ended with
French "militarism"' (Britain too has enjoyed a certain amount of Italian
mistrust, partioularly from the political right, since the Ethiopian sanc-
tions in the thirties.)
These attitudes contribute to the same trend discussed above. A senior
official in the Foreign Ministry privately fears that Italy will be motivated
to a more active international role in the next year or so by concern that
France will otherwise gain a preponderant position in Western Europe, The
US is enormously popular, but the same argument speaks of "unrest with the
American lead", as well as these other tensions, pulling Italy out of her
hitherto tranquil political orbit and into a path of activism with
objectives that are yet obscure.
This leitmotif of contemporary Italian political forecasting is worth
looking at rather closely, Italy has been a "good soldier" but sees othr
successfully practicing a species of "blackmail" which leaves the faithfK
retainers far behind in terms of attention and assistance, The new leadership
feels keenly the need for, "parity" with the Big Three of the West (although
an issue can still be made in Italy over the old pre-World War I debate a
to whether Italy should be the "smallest of the big" or the "biggest of the
small,") Moreover, since other NATO members such as France are seen to be
adopting individualistic courses of action. such moves as the ltailoAat-
tempts at rapprochement with Nasser tend to be justified to questioners in
such comparative terms. ("Germany extended credits to Nasser--why shouldn t
we?") There were of course earlier reflections of this attitude in negotia-
tions leading to the Trieste settlement of October 5, 1954, with some vocal
Italian elements complaining that the US paid far more attention to Tito 's
wishes than to Italy'so
Personalities in the Faiaci 7overnment gave additional momentum
to the natural tides of events. Fanfani, as his own Foreign Minister,
made a direct impact on the Palazzo Chigi as well as the Quirinale and
much 7as heard in Rome of his personal "clique" in the Foreign Service-
the so-called "Mau Maus" who are known to sympathize with left-wing trends in
the Democratic Christian party, and were recently alleged to have executed
an anti-NATO purge in the Serviceo6
Unquestionably Gronchi has also been an innovator in developing the
hitherto honorific role of President, particularly in foreign affairs; Western
6
For recent developments see C.L. Sulzberger's controversial dispatch in
New York Times, November 24, 195&
memories are green of his earlier calls for an "opening to the left" which
by implication would involve collaboration with at least the PSI--the Nenr
Socialists. The latter have moved toward ostensible "autonomy" of the
Communists, and only time can tell what Er government dominated by a socialist
coalition will mean for Italian foreign policy. Any Italian who takes his
country's helm today should be watched for signs that they will develop into
significant agents of history.
What is not often said about the new mood is that Italy's domestic
problems are such that nationalism could only be an escape from their exig-
encies. A noted Italian journalist whose cynicism about Italy's future is
exceeded only by his hostility toward the Church as the arch-ener of Italian
social and economic progress sees Italy, however nationalistic, as the tail
of the European dog, unable to change its foreign policies even if it
wished to. He depicts Italy as in a prerevolutionary situation similar to
that of Russia in 1905, and sees the "feudal barons" such as Enrico Mattei,
whose E.N.I. oil interests constitute an "extra-state" with its own foreign
policy and parliamentary deputies, in the process of "taking over" as the
state disintegrates. This gloomy forecast exaggerates to the detriment of
credibility but is nevertheless consistent with other diagnoses in its
profound contempt for the capacity of the Italian people to make the judg-
ments about foreign policy necessary to sustain its ostensibly democratic
character. A senior Italian diplomat complained to the writer that the
United States fails to understand that the "people" are not intelligent; the
Soviet leadership rightly considers the people to be "idiots" and conducts
its foreign policy on this assumption. This comment bears on the frequent
Italian emphasis on the UN as a propaganda agency. But it also suggests that
Guiseppi Mazzini and Carlo Sforza are not necessarily reliable guides to the
contemporary Italian political mentality.
The General Italian View of the UN
Italy, as noted, has no real diplomatic tradition as a member of the
UN although it has been a member from the beginning of the UN Specialized
Agencies, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, and of course NATO and the
European regional organizations. (Rome is the seat of the UN Food and
Agriculture Organization, as it was of the prewar International Institute
for Agriculture.)
But the distinctive features of the Italian view of the UN cannot be
accounted for solely by reference to Italy's unhappy years outside the gates,
barred time and again from the Soviet Union's first veto of Italian admis-
sion in 1947 until the package deal of 1955. To be sure, Italy chafed under
these perennial blows to Italian pride. In the eyes of the cognoscenti the
stature of the UN declined in Italy during this period also as a consequence
of the way in which the former Italian colonies question was handled, and
because of the failure of the Security Council to appoint a Governor for the
putative "Free Territory of Trieste." Certainly Italian opinion was not im-
mune to the more general reaction to the abortion of the UN's prime role as
the Cold War moved the security focus away from the UN and toward Europe
itself. (It is of more than psychological curiosity that Italy, according
to her prime public opinion tester, "cared" more about the UN when her
ambitions for membership were still unfulfilled; she was more interested in
7A detailed account of Italian relations with international organizations,
including the UN, up to 1955, is contained in the forthcoming publication of
the Carnegie Endowment for Intermtional Peace, Italyand the United Nations.
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becoming a member than she has been since the day of fulfillment,)
Yet there is a still more basic element in the Italian view of the UN0
Italy has its own very special reason for adopting an ambivalent approakh
to the UN and its relation to Italy"s future 0 One of the chiefs of the
Foreign Ministry summed it up blandly: Italy has "great. respect" for the UN,
but the new requirement that Italy take a public position on every issue
"creates problemso" (It is of course precisely these probleas that some le&d,
ers in Western Germany seem happy to avoid by virtue of Germany"s continued
exclusion from the UN"s council chambers-but with continued access to the
rest of the diplomatic paraphernalia the UN furnisheso) This dilemma is at
the heart of the Italian problem in the UN. Italy's foreign policy thrust,
particularly in economic terms, is once again toward the south, along the
African littoral of the Mediterranean basin, In the UN, issues between this
revolutionary region and Western Europe tend to be transformed into painful
political barriers between the two regions.
A former chief of UN Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, while displaying
the typically optimistic symptoms of the UN diplomatic brotherhood, sees
positive virtues in the UN. It cannot solve major political issues but is
useful above all for "educating new countries." It is a "college for every-
one."v It forms needful common opinions, and one is therefore justified in
being optimistic. Still, having to stand up and be counted creates "diffi-
culties" for Italy. The "technicians" who acquire responsibility for major
economic and technical assistance programming need better "political sense."
And the West is remiss in failing to exploit intelligently the opportunity
the UN offers to establish contacts with the rest of the world, The Russians,
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on the contrary, have seen this opportunity clearly and have succeeded in
making effective use of it,
The top civil servant dealing with problems of European organization
turns this estimate about slightly, "Italian policy" is an obsolete con-
ception; one is either for East or West, or one is a blackmailer. The UN
becomes important precisely because it is a stage for the battle and also the
scoreboard for its progress,, So far the West has a majority, but it is in
process of being lost. The communists are "poor diplomats " but are winning
in the use of the UN for propaganda purposes. The UN structure must be
defective because it seems to magnify the West's shortcomings and the Russians
advantages, but the important point is propaganda. This is an art, it is
implied, at which Italians have been known to excel but at which the Western
democracies tend to fumbleo Italy is seen to occupy a slightly independent
position as a nation possessing unique advantages in the UN, such as pro-
Arab proclivities and close ties to Latin-America. The awareness of such a
distinction makes Italian concern with Western "propaganda failures" in the
UN uncommonly frustrating,
Soviet experts tend to regard the UN in a somewhat specialized
light,and those in Italy are no exception, A former communnist activist who
is now an influential meiber of one of the more conservative parties con-
siders the UN to be a "danger to the peace 0 " If it is useful, its value is
for propagandao But on balance neither the UN nor, for that matter, NATO
can develop the necessary political counterstrategy to world communism. The
government's leading Soviet expert somewhat shares this view, finding the UN
ineffective with respect to major decisions that must be taken but "helpful"
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to the West in some cases,(Lebanon was a case strongly in point in the summer
of 1958). Both these opinions would tend to confirm the conclusion of a
shrewd observer of Italian politics that Italy as a nation may not be very
interested in the UN but is acutely conscious of its propaganda value. And
all of the views cited above would confirm the feeling of the editor of an
important Christian Democratic newspaper that .in Italian eyes, the major role
for the UN increasingly resides in its efforts to keep the peace in the
Middle East -- the prime target for renascent Italian overseas interests.
As in many other countries, Italian Government planners tend to make
sharp distinctions between political and economic affairs in directing
Italian participation in international organizations. Italian policy won a
modest success w:henu Italy joined the UN Security Council in 1958. But
to some observers outside the Government the single-minded drive for a Secur-
ity Council seat reflected the "anachronistic prestige policy" which sees
such matters exclusively in terms of "discrimination," True Italian interests,
some feel, call for an important role in the Economic and Social Council and
not the Security Council. One finds this hard to argue with in terms of the
logic of over-all Italian policy toward the underdeveloped countries of the
Middle East and elsewhere.
Suez, the UN. and the US
If popular sentiment in Britain and France castigated the US and the
UN-often without distinction-for interfering with their efforts to destroy
Nasser in October 1956, in Italy the reaction was largely the reverseo
Reference has already been made to strains of anti-British and anti-French
sentiment in the Italian international outlook. It is hard to say to what
*0
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extent these prejudices underlay the criticisms of the Suez adventure made
in some Italian circles. Just prior to the Israeli-Anglo-French attack, I taly
negotiated with Egypt for oil rights in the Sinai peninsula. Certainly the
British-French assault on the very object of Italian courtship served to
magnify a latent hostility which was already considerably exacerbated by
the repressive French policy in Algeria. Italy was hurt by the Suez decision,
in which she of course had no part, and many Italians were intensely critical,
particularly as necessary oil supplies were jeopardized.
Some organs of the CD and Social Democratic parties and the relatively
small conservative parties (Liberal, Radical, Republican) supported Italy's
NATO partners. But significant CD elements, including Fanfani and Gronchi ,
plus of course the Nenni Socialists, were opposed. Some Italian newspapers
took an anti-Nasser and pro-British line, but many Italians dismiss not only
the supporting newspapers but also the Foreign Ministry"s pro-British senti-
ments as wholly unreflective of Italian public opinion. It is of interest
that public opinion polls at the time of Suez indicated that the popular
reaction was more an expression of support for American policy than of anti-
pathy to Britain and France. In this sense, the general support for the
UN's role could be interpreted as essentially a reflection of pro-Americanism,.
A senior Italian diplomat commented that ten days after the attack most
Italians felt that a larger war had been averted by the US-UN reaction. This
has only to be compared with the lack of such an appraisal in France, for
example, to suggest the gulf between the two national estimates of both that
situation and of the validity and effectiveness of a policy of force in
dealing with Arab nationalism.
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But the general reaction was surprisingly mild, with many - as in
the United States,- expressing at least private sympathy with the attack
on Nasser. Aformercabinet minister who is ultraconservative in his
views characterizes US policy as "stupid" and as having opened the way to
Soviet penetration. At the other end of the political spectrum a profession-
al' internationalist believes that if the action had been pulled off quickly
and successfully it would have won Italian approval. As it was, some Italians
interpreted it as a sign of general Western weakness, of US "uncertainty,"
and as an indication to Europe that the UN should no longer be conceived of
as capable of acting in the interests of the West.
That Italy, however divided her reactions at the time, has drawn the
appropriate lessons from the Suez episode was perhaps most revealingly dis-
played in the Lebanese crASBs of the early summer of 1958, General reactions
appeared to favor almost amy UN solution. High government officials were
nnnimous in their relief that the UN became involved from the start, in
their apprehension with unilateral US and British intervention, and in their
eagerness to see Italy-as a country with no colonial "connections or
ambitions "-contribute significantly to a UN force in the area. One of the
chiefs of the Foreign Ministry privately went far beyond current Western
thinking and policy by advocating a genuinely international UN force, i.e.,
not composed of national contingents, arguing by illustration that a "UN
carrier" could have delivered light observation planes to Lebanon in 24
hours. whereas Italy could not do so even when requested by the Secretary
General.
The Italian view of the UN, not unlike the French view, tends to make a
strong identification between the UN and American policy, Estimates of the
worth of the UN to Italy depend to some extent on appraisals of the state
of American leadership, The US unquestionably continues to enjoy widespread
popular support in Italy, where anti-Americanism is at a minimum. Compe-
tent observers have noted an even further decline in anti-American criticism
in Italy in the last few years, attributed by some to the complexity of
policy-making in the West since Stalin's death, yielding in turn a greater
tolerance for the Americans who face these dilemmas responsibly. But
the Italian political elite retains a questioning attitude that is not
untypical of general Western European opinion at comparable levels. There
is the inevitable feeling that American power is not matched by experience
and maturity. In a fairly restricted circle of conservative thought
"excessive US anticolonialism" is blamed for Nasser and the "loss of
North Africa" every bit as much as in Belgium, Britain, and France, The US
is seen as "weak," "not supporting its strength," and endangering, by its
policy of "hope" toward the Soviet Union, an Italy entirely dependent on
US power. Another increasingly powerful element, referred to earlier, smarts
under the political restrictions attending the role of "Washington's best
follower" and is coming to view Italy's benefits as incommensurate,
Even the most balanced and friendly observers privately express their
concern with the American "lack of direction and initiative." Like
other Europeans, they feel that "constructive criticisms" of American policy
have been ignored by their mighty ally, with the result of encouraging
"unconstructive aspects" of the same critical spirit.
As elsewhere, the most specific manifestation of this attitude in terms
V ,
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of UN policies centers on the question of seating Communist China, US China
policy is not suported by either the political left or the political right,
the latter largely for the familiar reasons of hoped-for trade, Responsible
governmental officials indicated privately that Italian dissatisfaction
with US policy may result in an Italian vote in the next year or two in favor of
seating.
Estimates about popular sentiment toward the UN vary widely. Some
Foreign Ministry officials speak of "widespread public support," others of lack
of public enthusiasm based on "ignorance" of the UN, particularly before
Italy's admission in 1955. Others agree that the war made the Italian
people basically "indifferent" to all international organizations, But in
still another respected opinion the UN is "favored psychologically" by
Italians generally despite Italy's historical antipathy to anything labelled
"collective security" and also despite the "traditionally cynical bent" of
her peopleo
(The Italian Society for International Organization--the equivalent of
UN Associations elsewhere--is almost entirely supported (44/5 of its budget)
by direct Parliamentary appropriations of public funds. At the same time it
operates as an independent organization, and only in the last few years has
lost its Communist members from a board still widely representative of all
political factions.)
Any references to the Italian public need to take into account what
may be a greater gap between the well-informed and the uninformed than exists
in any of the other countries surveyed,. A leading student of public opinion
who is perhaps in the best position to know concludes that, except for
leadership groups, the gneral public is almost wholly ignorant of the UN
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and sees it as something "distant" and "in the hands of Americanso"
According to his findings, the public paid very little attention to world
affairs , even at the time of Suez.
Europe and the UN
Another student of Italian public opinion characterizes public opinion
toward the UN as "rational " while public opinion toward the European move-
ment is "emotional." Certainly if there is any foreign policy issue that has
succeeded in engaging the support and deep commitment of not only Italian
youth but Italian intellectuals as well, it is the movement for European
integrationo The Italian risorgimento of the last century supplies a mean-
ingful analogy for new efforts to unite neighboring political entities.
Clearly, Italy, like Germany, displays a willingness to go a considerable
distance cheerfully for the sake of European unity, and tends publicly to
attribute greater supranational qualities to existing and planned European
agencies than, for example, the Frencho Italian deputies are often elected
on the "European ticket," and all but the Communists voted for the Comnon
Market,(The Nenni Socialists abstained but voted for Euratom). Political,
economic, and social benefits are expected from integrationo ("Business
expects the Common Market to save it from nationalization.") Of course,
even discounting the Italian proclivity for political quips, some doubting
voices are heard, and in particular regarding the Conon Market. ("The
whole theme in Italy is avoidance of internal competition; how can it accept
external competition?"; "Italian monopolies like FIAT fear the Common Market";
"Big business will do all right but medium-sized business and agriculture
will suffer"; "The Socialists abstained because they plan to change its
'-
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complexion when they come into power"; etc,,) But the Common Market has a
major role to play in Italy's immediate future, and the European movement
in general enjoys vigorous interest and support in Italy; the polls show
widespread public acceptance of the specific prices that must be paid for
integration.
Yet in Italy, unlike Belgium and the Netherlands, for example, no
connection seems to be made between the UN and a major development of the
European role0 No one could be found who thought in terms of integration as
strengthening the Italian position in the UN. Whether or not this is because
Italy's participation in European organization far antedates her UN member-
ship, Italian leaders do not envisage a European community as of value for
"matching" other external blocs, as do, for example, the low countrieso As
Italians see it, European participation relates primarily to internal prob-
lems, and this focus is entirely understandable in a country with two million
unemployed and other pressing domestic problems which have a chance of being
eased by association on a wider economic basis.
At the same time, some Italian planners look beyond Europe-that is
to say, away from ito Italy's solutions may lie not in Europe but in the
Mediterranean, and here a number of Italians believe that UN membership,
rather than being an embarrassment, could perhaps become an advantage. The
last section of this paper examines this theme0
Economic Uses of the UN
Italian planners are divided as to the "multilateralization" of aid to
underdeveloped countrieso UN machinery is of course used to finance Somaliland
under Italian trusteeship (Italy gave $15 million in aid to Somaliland
in the period 1954-6, as well as $1.5 million to another former Italian
colony, Libya. 8) The Pella Plan may be dead, but other multilateral avenues
are under exploration for making more palatable the needful contributions by
the Western nations of capital assistance to underdeveloped countries.
There is another side to the argument. One senior bureaucrat thought
any elaboration of existing UN programs would lead to an increase in Soviet
penetration of the Middle East. Since Arabs tend to see any sort of
governmental aid as political, the suggested solution was a greatly enhanced
role for private enterprise. The most extreme argument of this nature sees
economic aid through the UN as a way of arranging for the United States to
finance the "enemies" of the West.
Italy has favored the SUNFED concept as a nay of supplementing the
kind of developmental capital which the International Bank has so far been
unable to furnish. The interest in multilateral forms of economic aid is a
continuing one. It needs to be repeated that the Italian economy is a
"dependent" one to a degree unknown by her Western partners, and that Italy, as a
"half-developed" country, is intensively vulnerable to the fluctuations of
international economic policies.
Perhaps because Italy is in this ambiguous economic position, her long-
range economic policies are still in process of creation. Some Italian
officials profess to see virtues in both bilateral and multilateral forms
of economic assistance but nonetheless recall that even the modest Italian
contributions to the UN Technical Assistance program came under political attack
at home. (A total of $500,000 was contributed in the period 1954-56;
8. UN Statistical Yearbook, 1957, p. 451.
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in the same period Italy also contributed $100,000 to UNICEF and $1 million
to UNKRA; the 1957 technical assistance contribution--the lira equivalent
of $112,000--is actually smaller than the contribution of such UN members
as Uruguay, Egypt, Pakistan, and the Ukranian S S.R.)9 On balance, Italy will
doubtless be on the side of multilateralism although her own contributions
will be modest.
Italy, the Mediterranean, and the Future
Any political assessment of the Italian view of the uses of the UN for
the present and near future comes to rest in the area of "colonial" policy--
apostrophized because in Italy the term is used pejoratively.
Out of Italy's role as a defeated nation, and above all out of her loss
of the three African colonies, have emerged opportunities and ideas for
political and commercial relations across the Mediterranean that are essen-
tially denied to all her allies save the other vanquished nation--Germany.
Out of this setting has come the economic adventuring of Enrico Mattei and
his government energy exploration monopoly in the Mid-and Near East, carrying
with it such innovative relations with oil producing countries as the 75:25
ratio Mattei negotiated with Iran. Also out of this situation one can dis-
corn portents of a new mediatory role for Italy as between Europe and Af rica,
a role toyed with musingly by high government officials in private, if
deprecated publicly. Those who know President Gronchi best believe that he vould
"jump at" the opportunity for Italy somehow to mediate the tensions that
'alock better European relationships in the Near East and Africa, e.g. Algeria,
9. Ibid., p. 458. For detailed treatment of this subject see the forthcoming
Carnegie Endowment study referred to in footnote 7.
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rolations with Tunisia and Morocco, issues with Egypt. These are tensions vhich
in Italian eyes hinder a more rapid fulfillment of Italy's--and the West's--
proper destiny in the age now begun. Italian planners realize that Italy is
in.,escapably identified with Europe. But they are impatient to see the end
of the Somraliland Trusteeship in 1960 in order to present Italy to the
members of the Arab-Asian-African world even more persuasively as a simon-
pure noncolonial power.
The specific impulses Which urge Italians into a major African roLo Go
beyond the intimations of destiny which can be sensed beneath the surface of
Italian policy. Italian commercial interests are alert for markets in
Egypt and the Middle East, and Italy's official pro-Arab policy was heavily
underscored by the personal gestures of friendship made by Mattei and Fanfani to
Abdel Gamal Nasser, still the arch-enemy of their next door neighbor and
ally. According to public opinion experts, among the general population the
lower classes tend to be pro-Arab, the upper classes pro-Israel. The official
policy of proArabism is not a sentimental or emotional one but is based on a
calculation of Italy's economic interests0
The economic motive is not, however, the whole story. Italian trade
riith the Middle East appears to loom large, particularly in the minds of
major Italian manufacturers, and there is much talk of Italian "economic
ponetration" in the Middle East (in much the same voin as the talk of larg-e-
scale markets in Communist China). But such trade is only roughly 5% of
Italy's total external trade and is small compared to trade with her
European partners. Actually, the political component is equally influon-
tial in defining the Italian role in the underdeveloped world and, by ezteni.on
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in the UN. Italy's geographic position involves strong historic ties with
people across mare nostrum. Some thoughtful Italians coceive the Middle
East to be the most dangerous area in the world because it lacks an identi-
fiable status quo and is therefore highly unstable. The need to keep peace
in the area is felt acutely, and by simple logic the UN appears to many
responsible Italians to offer the best promise of maintaining peace and
security there. Italian leaders may pursue a more dynamic role in the
area than some of their partners might at least privately wish for, but, as
with the parallel West German penetration, such activity can be and is
publicly ascribed to a wish to improve the position not only of Italy but also of
the entire Western alliance. In several statements nade in late July 1958, then
Premier Fanfani coupled affirmations of support for his allies with the
assertion that Italy, with a knowledge of the Mediterranean area "that goes
back into the millenia," would be in a position to talk to Africans without
arousing suspicions "because since long, we have no possessions to defend
or to extend."10 Italy is in the front lines of the Western aligiment, but
At the same time, Italy has no colonies and therefore is in a
better position to show interest in the national aspirations of
other peoples, without arousing distrust and suspicion.1 1
This serves well as a statement of the comtemporary Italian theme.
It does not necessarily have to lead to a sharp break with either Europe
10Washington, D.C. July 29, 1958. New York Times, July 30, 1958.
1 1Premier Fanfani in an interview with Leo T. Wollemborg , Boston Globe,
July 30, 1958.
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or America. Indeed, it comes close to American policy and seems to this
writer somewhat better attuned to the realities of the age than the attitudes
that predominate in France. There is a growing role in the world for
the "middle power," particularly one that can pioneer pathways that the great
powers may discern but are somehow unable to take. Italy may well
create precedents for a new style of European approach to Africa. At its
best, the Italian move is designed to demonstrate that the West is capable
of genuine understanding of the new nationalism, and that a self-respecting
and dignified partnership with the West is available.
Idealism is strong in the Italian regime, and,as Signor Fanfani has
written, "Our aim is not to die in a bloody war against Communism. Our aim
is to outlive Communism, to build a better society that will make Comiunism
12
seem old-fashioned and sterile." If this idealism does not apply specific-
ally to the way Italians view the UN, it nevertheless makes it possible for
them to perceive practical uses for the organization in the period ahead,
particularly in the categories of propaganda, politico-military measures
under international auspices to stabilize the Middle and Near East, and
contacts between Europeans and non-Europeans in a setting where the former can
at any rate seek to create an identity of interests, if not a common interest.
The dangers of a national policy that appears to combine cynicism with
idealism are too familiar in Italy (and elsewhere) to require elaboration.
Machiavelli and St. Francis are essentially incompatible, and ultimately one
must triumph over the other. Italian political cynicism often reflects
simply a style, and in this sense is a facade. But it may be more than this
12Amintore Fanfani, "Italian Democracy Faces Another Test," 36 Foreign
Affairs (1958), p. 452.
9 1
9 4
V -22
in the current foreigu plicy setting0  Italy accepts her contemporary role,
but ith regret; above sA, she considers the two prime antagonists--the
U and the USSR-to be something les than intelligent or morally superior
to their various allies. No one speaks much any more of the danger of a new
Italian imperialism,, or fascism, or communism. Certainly the present evi 0
dence counter-indicates any real possibility of these contingencies material-
izing. but another latent possibility - neutralism - should at least be
reckoned with in Western planning. Italian national interests continue to
center on the Western alliance for defense against Communist military aggres-
sion 3but as that particular form of danger seems to recede, and as internal
subversion becomes minimized through economic and social progress, other
strong Italian interests may acquire increasing importance. Some responsible
Italians see the role of NATO changing as the result of possible new agree-
nents between the Soviet Union and the US and do not want Italy to be caught
napping by the change. Balancing the nostalgia for a really uncommitted role
is, however, a sense of realism which may allow for greater elasticity in
Italy's concept of her role in the West but not, at this reading, anything
that could be called positive neutralismo Much will depend on the impact of
the common market on the Italian economy, and on the complexion of the Italian
government.
The pull to the South will remain strong, and will doubtless increase.
This can signfi:cantly aftfect the interpretation which Italy places on the
UN and its capabilities, for here above all the potentiality of the UN is
growing, rather than diminishing, as its rembership becomes ever more weighted
with new African states and as these states and their political brethren
continue to see the UN as a place where their own interetits demand to be
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served. Issues of colonialism, economic assistance to underdeveloped
countries, technical aid, and trade and commodity regulation are all current
and potential UN problems on which Italian interests can be expected to
diverge in particular ways from Europe and the US. In another dimension
of Italian interest, the UN can be seen as a prime political and even military
agency to keep the instabilities of the Southern Mediterranean region from
breaking out into uncontrollable violence. The present profile of Italian
foreign policy is not clear as to its purposes, and will not be until the goals
of that policy become more apparent, Certainly the Common Market will loom
larger in Italian policy and planning than the UN in the period ahead: Italy
is serious about Europe. In the UNItaly will continue to follow the American
lead not because it wishes to but because it must, while at the same time
trying to help loosen up Western policy regarding Red China, East-West trade, anid the
like . Italy will continue to play what she conceives to be a special role
vis a vis Latin America andoparticularlythe Middle East, and is intensely
serious about the UN role with respect to the latter. If Italian planning
and policies do not yet spell out the full implications of this range of
prospects, no estimate of the future made by an outsider can afford to dis-
count them.
THE CONTEMPORARY FRENCH VIEW OF THE UN
Introduction
This paper, like the others in this collection, seeks to explore the
essence of France's attitude and outlook toward the UN, Toward this end,
it takes as its primary sources the thinking of some prominent and in-
fluential Frenchmen rather than the record of French action and pronounce-
ments in the UN. The technique followed in these conversations, as else-
where in Europe, was designed to set France's UN participation in as broad
a framework as possible. It was hoped that under these conditions appraisals
about French-UN relations might reflect political reality, undistorted to the
greatest extent possible by the prism of the UN itself. By setting the
analysis within the larger ethos of French policy, it was also hoped to gain
historical depth.
If it is presumptuous so to characterize a brief study which is based
upon a handful of conversations, however illuminating, it is doubly so when
the nation in question is undergoing a prolonged crisis. It can be argued
that crisis may have indeed become the norm, but there are varieties of
crises. Each period of post-revolutionary French history has made its own
compromise between the perpetually available extremes of Jacobin democracy
and one or another form of Bonapartism. If the Gaullist period through which
France is now passing is serving to sharpen some French qualities and highlight
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certain political instincts, at the same time other characteristics which may
have greater long-term validity are submerged under unaccustomed unanimity and
unity0
For one example, the classic French mode of rationalism and political
logic, however precious or unrelated to political realism, is missing from the
mstique which today animates French policyo To be sure, the contemporary
mystique has its own brand of rationalism, as when with a single stroke General
de Gaulle destroyed the immobilisme which has hitherto paralyzed French policy
toward Sub-Sahara Africa, coming to terms in a breath-taking initiative with
Black Africa's political drives0 Yet with all admiration for the only political
figure capable of having restored a sense of national coherence and purpose in
1958, one still reserves judgment as to the accuracy of analysis at a time when,
according to the policy's very author, "face to face with the greatest perils,
the only salvation lies in greatness."' Amidst his own eloquence de Gaulle
quotes with high approval Chamfort: "Men of reason have endured, Men of
passion have lived0 "2 This could well be a paraphrase of the younger Oliver
Wendell Holmes; but to a top-ranking Italian diplomat it "sounds like Mussolini,"
and it frightened half to death other prominent Europeans with whom the writer
talked.
French policies under de Gaulle are turning out to be more liberal and
more faithful to France's international commitments than many such European
observers had dared--or perhaps wished--to hope. Large numbers of Frenchmen
appear to agree with the General's conviction that a nation can do nothing without
a firm sense of its own destiny and place in history. Implicit in the Gaullist
thesis is the argument that while France may have been committed tc actions
vis-a-vis the United States or NATO or the European Community under the
l General Charles de Gaulle, The Call To Honour, I (New York: Viking Prs. 1§Th6)
pO 520
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Fourth Republic, it is only by restoring French self-respect and dignity that
these commitments can be meaningfully acted upon. If this argument is sound
and, if the infusions of grandeur really do constitute a needful stimulant and
not a dangerous intoxicant, one would be entitled to conclude that but for this
very process there could be no hope for either a healthy France or a successful
Europeo The test, as it was with President Eisenhower in the United States in
1952, is two-fold0 The nation must be reunited, even at the cost of alienating
the most dedicated preelection supporters; and the unpopular and inconclusive
war--whether Korea or Algeria--must somehow be liquidated with honor. DeGaulle
has already registered impressive successes on the first count. The triumph
of the entire political experiment continues to depend on what he can do in
Algeria.
The basic elements of France's contemporary international outlook were
not created by de Gaulle. As they had once before in 1940, circumstances again
created de Gaulle in 1958. With or without him, two overwhelming facts determine
French relations with the wider world, including specifically the UN, at this
stage in her history,
First is the cumulative experience of defeat, starting in 1940 and still
not ended, an experience unknown in precisely the same form by Any of her allies
or, for that matter, by any of the recently vanquished. France may have
accepted, however painfully, the defeats of French arms in Indochina and of
French policy in French India, Tunisia, Morocco, and the Saar. But she cannot
accept the ensemble which they represent when one adds Algeria to the roster.
Humiliation and a sense of national loss are bad enough but can be endured, as
the British have shown, Compounded with frustration, the effect is corrosive
and, as iith the psychologically undefeated Germans in the 19202s, can be deadlyo
"Defeat is never so galling as when no battle has been fought1," Algeria has
3 Jean Marie Domenach, "Democratic Paralysis in France," 37 Forem fairs
(1958), P. 310
9P4
VI-3a
crystallized the trauma of postwar France, and out of this profound disturbance
comes a whole complex of attitudes of xenophobia and chauvinism which the
disaster at Suez spectacularly crystallized0 Algeria is a symbol carrying
vastly more weight than even its own perplexities rationally warrant, And
out of the whole sequence of events has grown an appraisal of the international
scene which differs markedly from our own and renders suspect any seeming meet-
ing of minds with respect to such problems as the Near East, to take the most
egregious example.
At its extremities this view sees all nationalistic movements in colonial
territories as "communistic" and intolerable The "revolution of rising
expectations" is regarded as a slogan for blackmail of the West 0 France
"understands" the forces at work, but, in the words of a high official of the
Independent Party, she is "determined to defend the white race and civilization
against communism." A sympathetic view of the claims which this contemporary
revolution makes on Western society for a larger share of
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political and economic power is, to some leaders of the French r* ght
(and to a certain portion of the center and the lcft), nothing short of
treacon to the cause of Western civilization.
One is tempted to describe the second major backdrop for French attitudes
toward the UN in terms of the weaknesses and ultimate collapse of French parlia-
mentary democracy. Much could be said here with the clear recollection that
the only true majorities in the Fourth Republic's deplorable Assembly wore
formed around foreign affairs issues. But the more profound fact for our
purpose is the racial memory of France, so to speak, which carries the dual
image of Hitler and of Munich into the present but applies it not so m~uch to
Soviet Russia as to Nasser and the tangled skein of relationships centering on
Middle East nationalism. In a simplified popular version of this
attitude, firmly fixed by the Suez experience, Nasser "stole" the "Frenc" canal
company, Nasser helped the Algerian rebels who are still "killing French boys.,"
Nasser is "Hitler," and those who are "appeasing" him are the "men of Munich"
who are now being opposed by the "new men" of France who are "anti-Munich t*
This thesis would above all apply to Amsrican policy, which is "soft" and
"uncertain," and to the United Nations which for these purposes is a dangerou.
"extension" of American policy,
Many other things could be said about what at the outset I called the
ethos of the contemporary French world outlook as it affects the UN and the
Western world's prospects in that organization. Above all, one could point
to those Frenchmen who do not share, the Vyths and racial terrors which grip
some other Frenchmen (see below), France, says her leading student of public
opinion, still thinks in teis of the 19th century and is pained and shocked
when her partners do not back her up across the board0 In the words of the
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editor of the most widely read paper in France, French chauvinism is a
disease arising from the recent experiences of war and occupation, and the
"primitive" reaction France is displaying is a phenomenon of the political
right only; de Gaulle will keep the anti-US and anti-UN by-products "under
control," One of the ablest and brightest of the grands commis in the Quai
d'Orsay who have kept France's foreign relations afloat through the numbing
discontinuities of recent years predicts a left-wing reaction within one to
two years, accompanied by one of France's periodic times of political "ldensity
Still another Frenchman recently noted that "the fundamental paradox of the
French situation is that democracy cannot be defended against fascism without
the help of the Communists,", The issues of 1789 have yet to be settled in
France, and it is entirely clear that the issues of 1945-58 have not by any
means been played out. Another kind of regime will give rein to tendencies
that are now suppressed or at any rate repressed. This is the warning that
affects every element of the analysis which follows.
The French Image of the UN
The way responsible French leaders view the UN depends on yet another
historic memory: France's paramount position in the League of Nations., In
many important ways the League was an instrument of French foreign policy. 5
An influential view of the UN, on the other hand, sees an organization "sc .
up by the United States" cs "an instrument to carry out its wishes," As a
battlefield between the US and the Soviet Union, the UN has the same depressing
effect on Frerichmen that it has on Americans, but French reactions have additional
4. Ibid, po 4la
5. See Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Evolution or Revolution? (Cambridge: HarvaM
University Press, 1957), Chapters 2, 3, and 4,.
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dimensions. The memory of Munich sharply defines the French sense of repe-
tition, leading to the logical conclusion that the UN is failing as the League
failed in analogous circumstances0 If the UN is an extension of the US, neither
is "helping" the French position. After the ultimate proof of this insight in
1956, when both the US and the UN "failed" France in Suez--and Hungary-nothing
remains but at best passive indifference, at worst active hostility.
Even the partisan alignments around the UN have collapsed: if the French
left sustained the League as a device for arbitration of international disputes,
fighting its battles with the political right on this ground, the commitment
of the Socialist party to a repressive Algerian policy succeeded in destroying
the possibility of major partisan support for the UNO To be sure, public support
for the UN continues to come from certain sectors of the French intelligentsiao
Here also the tradition of concern for an international regime of law persists,
but it has gone underground since Suez.
Some Frenchmen, while styling themselves civilise, have always distrusted
the word "culture" as a Germanic concept. But the notion of culture is implicit
in French suspicions of any proposed extension of UN activities and powers0 The
UN, "run by the English-speaking," has an "Anglo-Saxon style0 " Any elaboration
of that bureaucracy means, to many Frenchmen, the progressive elimination of
French cultural influence--of la civilisation frangaise the superiority of which
both as an intellectual style and a political mode remains unquestioned by French=
men at large,
Other kinds of explanations for the negative and often hostile French attitude
toward the UN can be found0 One of the few senior M.R.P. politicians to come
out on top in the 1958 political revolution believes that anti-UN attitudes,
particularly on the part of le General stem from an almost abstract devotion
to democracy. If the French people so elect, the argument runs, de Gaulle
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will opt for European community, possibly even for Atlantic Union, which would
also be "democratic,," But the UN involves governments, not peoples, and is
therefore "not democratic." The Gaullist view of the UN can only be guessed
at since it has never been really articulated, The limited evidence available
suggests that de Gaulle is not genuinely interested in anything outside of
France's alliance structure. It also suggests that the Great Power directorate
--so long as it includes France--is the most congenial mode for expressing the
grandeur of France, and clearly favors the Security Council over the more popu.
lous bodies.
Summing up some of the arguments, the UN seems "distant" to most Frenchmen,
while Europe seems closer. The UN is invariably identified with the US, and both
are currently unpopular. France rates the UN lower than the League because her
own status there has diminished. But these are insufficient explanations for
widespread active hostility, and equally widespread absence of planning for a
more effective and persuasive French-and Western-policy in the UN Underlying
these sentiments is a moral stance which developed throughout the years of
debate in the UN about French North Africa and came to a climax with the Sues
fiasco, A man who led the French General Assembly delegation several times
sees the UN as attempting to judge France in the fashin of a court, The UN's
amoral standing" in France is low because the French have learned that they
cannot place any "trust" in it. To France the UN is, in the words of a shrewd
Swiss observer of French affairs, a "ship adrift" without Western influene
The latter theme recurs time and again; the Fourth Committee (Trusteeship), at
whose hands France has admittedly taken a rather consistent pounding, is dangerous
because it is "un-European0 " The theme of US relations re-enters here. The U
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may be "pro-French" but it has brought about disaster because of its failure
to support France "all the way" for fear of alienating the growing Asian-
African grouping. American efforts to moderate the anticolonial positions
receive no credit whatsoever.
These critical attitudes and estimates come to rest finally on the funda-
mental differences between French and American appraisals of the nationalist
movements in formerly dependent areas. The remedies suggested grow out of
the divergent diagnoses of the problem. In the long run, according to current
French doctrine, the American policy of "appeasement" will only succeed in
"losing" the Asian-Arab-African world. Strength is the only thing the Arabs
understand, This proposition rests on two major assumptions American policy
has generally rejected: unyielding defense of the status guo is the path to
"victory"; "compromise" is the path to "defeat." The September 1958 referendum
offering immediate independence to all African dependencies except Algeria re-
presented a profound deviation from the earlier French doctrine, and it is a
tribute to the Gaullist magic that France accepted this volte-face. But the
underlying philosophy of the status guo powerfully affects the spirit in which
France continues to estimate the present and future value of the UN.
This is not the entire story, Even in its present state of political
hypnosis, France contains many thoughtful people who will supply correctives to
the severity and intransigeance of the more general view.
In one view, if the UN has betrayed the moral values by which the West lives,
it still can be used to "advance those values" in the world, It is in this
sense a useful tool, although on balance it remains something to be "put up
with," and certainly not an asset. Another figure in the political center
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wishes to see the UN strengthened and wants it to "succeed,." In this view, only
the "ignorant" identify the UN with the US without differentiation, and the
leadership elements who encouraged this twin prejudice at the time of Sues
were motivated by considerations of "party politics."
An official of the M.R.P. approved on behalf of his party the "principles"
of the UN, and the "historical necessity" of its existence. But the difficulty
is in practice. A high foreign ministry official merely confirmed his member-
ship in the international brotherhood of diplomats concerned with UN1 affairs
when with massive understatement he allowed that criticism of the colonial
powers in the UN constitutes a "problem." But the problem goes beyond pro-
cedure or practice, even in these milder-statements0 One thoughtful politician
likened the UN General Assembly to l'Assemblee Nationale, with all the -invidi-
ous comparisons this connoted0  The UN, he concluded, is too wrapped up in short-
term politics and tensions for even "liberal" Frenchmen to look ahead rationally
to its possible future uses, such as-my suggestion, not his-helping to bridge
the gap between Europe and Black Africa.
The political party receiving the largest share of votes in the November
1958 French elections was not even in existence in the previous summer when the
conversations were held which form the basis for this report. From the moment
of de Gaulle's investiture in the frenetic final week of May 1958 the traditional
parties in France in many ways ceased to exist. Since 1956, when Guy Hollet took
his stand on behalf of the Socialists, all parties save the Communists and Radical
Socialist remnants who follow Mendes-France have been officially committed to a
strong national policy toward Algeria, There is thus no real political opposition
in France, especially since the failure of the left to forestall de Gaullees
accession to power, As de Gaulle himself invents new formulas with regard to
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Algeria, new lines may come to be drawn, Until then, France presents a novel
surface appearance of political harmony, and one seeks in vain for "issues"
as between parties all of whom--with the exceptions noted above--were "in the
government" through the period until the formation of the Cabinet in January 1959,
Having said this, one can still make some general observations based on
views not of the party "leaders," many of whom have suddenly become political
corpses,9 but of some party functionaries and executives,. The UN as such is
not a party issue in France, particularly since the great majority of Frenchmsn
ignore it as a factor in any way affecting their lives and fortunes. The
spectrum of partisan differences is thus limited. The Socialists are conceded
to be more "internationally minded," but to some observers even they have
already lost their distinctive flavor and have become bourgeois and conservative.
Their sympathy with the predominantly bourgeois class of colons in Algeria is
even heretically ascribed to "class" ties* We have mentioned the Mollet version
of Nasser as Hitler and Sues as Munich, The UN takes its definiton from this
vision: "If the United Nations is to yield systematically before the desires
of dictators, and require, on the other hand, that it be obeyed untiringly by
the democracies, then it is no longer an organization worthy of its international
character."6  Mollet's Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, drew the picture even
more finely:
Some think the international organization could modify
the Algerian problem. I must say that while France is pre.
pared to set forth the problem it never will accept orderso
There is no question of our leaving the UN. We feel that
the Charter is necessary and we intend to make it work to
our advantage.
Though France greatly desires to adhere to internation-
al rules, it does not accept the idea of one-way rules, which
some observI and which others merely interpret to their own
advantage.
6. Guy Mollet, quoted in New York Times, May 16, 1957o
7, Christian Pineau, remarks at Le Mans, August 18, 1957. Quoted in New York
Herald Tribune, August 19, 1957.
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The default of the French Socialists as the classical European advocates
of greater internationalism has thus assigned that role elsewhere in the poli-
tical left. A leading political spokesman of the MoR.P. explains general
French hostility to the UN as due to the fact that the Communist party tends
to "talk about it." The standing of the UN would be higher, as in the case of
the Korean War, if the Communists opposed ito (On the other hand, the chief
permanent official of that party hastened to add that "everyone accepts the
principle" of UN membership, and that the political center was "less usp.cious"
of the UN than the actively hostile right.) Perhaps only the followers of
Pierre Mendis-France-which category included many of the brightest young minds
in France--have any enthusiasm for the notion that the UN can and should serve
as an instrument for the development of more effective relationships between
the West and the remainder of the world. The Foreign Ministry official who
privately-and sympathetically-voiced this belief agreed that day-to-day
developments in the UN still appear to most other Frenchmen as contrary to
French interests,
A senior official of the Independent and Peasants Party, whose leader--
Antoine Pinay-is de Gaulle's chief economic lieutenant, described his party
as "patriotic" but not "nationalistic," extremist party spokesmen like Duchet
to the contrary notwithstanding. He forecast, presciently in the light of
events, a realignment in which the "new conservatives" would emerge as a party
resembling the British Tories, more nationalistic and more devoted to free
enterprise than previous alignments of this order. One can assume that such
a grouping would sustain the general French antipathy for the UN as presently
constituted. If one accepts the forecast of a new coalition on the left, post-
de Gaulle, still many perceptive French observers would see a continuation of
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present policies regarding the UN, with only the possibility of a greater
official interest in expanding the UN's technical and economic programs.
Appraisals of French popular attitudes toward the UN, as contrasted
with elite or official or party attitudes, find common ground in the conclusion
that the UN is "not popular" with the French people, that the public is
"indifferent and ignorant"--although not necessarily hostile-and that, above
all, the French people consider the UN as "unfair" to France, specifically as
it "helped totalitarianism" by its dual responses to Suez and Hungary. The
public does not support the UN because it "doesn't care" and is preoccupied
with internal problems.
The French UN Association, once active in many French centers, is now
dormant; it certainly does not seek to influence the Government as in the
US and, to some extent, Britain0
The leader of the powerful Foreign Affairs Committee of the French
Chamber of Deputies explained that his committee is fully aware that the
US must lead the free world, and that "it can do this only within the UN
framework0 " But he added that this educated view must be modified in practice
by the conviction that the average Frenchman, while perhaps willing to accept
the UN as the price for American leadership, expects that his government will
pay no more attention to that organization than it absolutely has to,
His summation was that France attaches the greatest importance to the
US and none at all to the UN,
0 4
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Suez and Hungary
Estimates vary as to the impact of Suez and Hungary on France's broad
attitude toward the UN. One of the leading Parisian editors asserts that
only a minority was actively anti-UN at the time of Suez. (In a Swiss
journalistic view, French newspapers were a prime factor in "prejudicing" the
French people in that period.) There is some evidence that the "younger
responsibles" do not go along with the predominant reaction. One specialist
believes that the US is more blamed for frustrating French designs at Suez
than the UN, whose role is "forgotten 1 1 But a Frenchman of great prominence
claims that the whole experience is not forgotten and "will never be," given
the "fact" that the Algerian question would be "solved" by now if the US and
UN had not "propped up" Nasser, (France, says this personage, is now "proven"
to be vindicated since the US and other Western powers "now see" that France
was "right.") An Italian diplomat who was in Paris at the time felt that the
French were "unanimously" furious with the UN for damaging French "honor1'
He sees French hostility to the UN as having increased markedly since Suez,
A rightist politician believes that Suez may be over with but that it
"poisoned" trans-Atlantic relations for a long time to come; Suez wae the
"cross-roads" of the entire Western position vis-A-vis the Middle East, and
the so-called humanitarian attitude of the US and UN contributed to a new
Munich in which the "patriotic" French people will never understand the sup,
pression of their policy
That this opinion was not unanimous is attested to by the admittedly
lonely voices who deplored the French Suez adventure. Ironically, some
intellectuals who were anti-American prior to 1956, largely because of r
support for NATO, were made pro-American by this country's stand in the UN
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at the time of Sues. Yet those who feel that the US-UN stand may have
averted a widespread and possibly unmanageable war are almost wholly un-
representative of the great majority.- It cannot be concluded yet that
France as a nation learned anything from the Sues episode, in the way that
a growing number of their collaborators across the Channel have, however
grudgingly,
As for Hungary, a guess can be hazarded that a majority--possibly:a
large majority-of Frenchmen would have enthusiastically supported Western
intervention at the time, The UN is condemned in other countries, including
the United States, for not having done a "damn thing" in Hungary, in the
words of a leading French politician with long UN experience. But there are
not many other countries of which it can be said that while there was no
bloodshed in the near civil war situation in May of 1958, blood did run
in the streets of Paris in October 1956. There is little or no support for
the view that Western crossing of the de facto truce line between East and
West -to support the Hungarians might have precipitated all-out warfare,
despite the fact that the same Frenchmen often resist other lesser moves on
the grounds of provocation of the Soviets. One does not look for logic here,
or even a sense of political responsibility. The emotions of France were
profoundly touched by the Hungarian uprising and its brutal suppression, and
the dignity of the West is permanently irapaired in French eyes because it did
not do what at the time it felt it must.
The US and the UN
Closely related to these popular sentiments is the body of French atti-
tudes toward the US0 Reference has already been mede to common strictures on
American policy The latter is invariably described as being characterized by
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incertitude, specifically regarding the Middle East and, most particularly,
how to deal with Nasser. The UN, in this view, is even more of an image of
American foreign policy, since it reflects in its succession of criticized
actions the "vacillations" of US policy,
It was of course not vacillation by what was in a sense the unexpected
certitude of American policy at Suez which left France resentful and suspi-
cious. At a different level it is the relative consistency of American atti-
tudes of anticolonialism which baffles and even infuriates the French. It is
surprising that this irony should be lost on the French for the US has compro-
mised its own "principles" more than once in the UN in response to French
pressures0 But logic actually counts for nothing in the argument. The US,
says a high Quai d'Orsay official, should act like the "great, strong, rich
power it is, instead of seeming to be ridden with fear" of the Soviet Union
and uncertainty how to deal with Middle East nationalism, postures which end
in encouraging chantage--blackmail--from these "enemies of the West." Many
others in the right and center of the French political spectrum share the view
of the urgency of a bold display of American power. But the dilemma for Ameri-
can policy is underscored when a left-wing intellectual criticizes with equal
vigor US incertitude but this time because we do not settle down more consistently
on the other side of the fence, that is to say, in the direction sought by
those few who approve of the basic American interpretation of the drives behind
contemporary Arab and other non-European nationalism.
Perhaps the soundest conclusion is that French attitudes toward the US are
ambivalent 0 Students of French public opinion believe that French anti-Ameri-
can attitudes stem largely from disappointment with our failure to lead the
kind of counterrevolutionary crusade many Frenchmen sincerely and even passionately
believe is the only sound policy to be followed. Rationally, American and
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French interests are seen to coincide, at least in the Atlantic area. While
it may be misleading to say, as one official did, that only the "uninformed"
criticize the US, a certain oscillation can be detected between the two poles,
Anti-Americanism has doubtless diminished since the fall of 1956, but it re-
mains a chronic victim of the French weakness for blaming French troubles on
foreigners. In this the French are of course members of a far wider human
family.
The UN, Europe, and French Security
France has today the very guarantee her policy was dedicated to seeking
throughout the interwar years prior to 1939. The United States unequivocally
guarantees French independence, and perhaps for this reason France feels freer
to maneuver within the coalition than she might if less sure of her position.
The UN as a security instrumentality impresses France even less than her allies,
particularly those Canadians and others who are actively thinking through the
security assets of the UN in limited military situations where great power
intervention might be disastrous. Her most UN-oriented civil servants dis-
courage the UN force idea by using the budgetary argument so familiar in British
-and, for a time, American-Treasury circles, as a means of frustrating political
action (although allowing that an ad hoe UN force "might" be useful in certain
carefully defined situations.) Europe, on the other hand, has not only security
potentialities for France but represents a profound political nostalgia, perhaps
as a substitute for earlier French attachment to the League of Nations.
Some Socialists and centrists see the European movement as a source of
non-military security to Franee, But at the currently weightier end of the
political scale there is little resemblance to the Dutch insight that creation
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of a European Community would strengthen France's position in her UN contacts,
Such an estimate would need to have for its premise a reduced vision of French
stature, and this is a vision few Frenchmen appear to have acceptedo Still,
Robert Schuman and other advocates of European Community have advanced the
argument that France 's interest lies in seeking to unify European politics
to remedy the disequilibrium in the UN which gives disproportionate strength
to the "prejudiced" and "fanatical" blocs now "riding rough-shod" over the
8
"weak and divided" Europeanso For a time after the shock of Suez, particu-
larly given the U!Vs part therein, it seemed as though the French would embrace
Europe with a new intensity, on the rebound, as it were0 9  "Old style French
nationalism" may have disappeared at the moment when all but the extreme right
voted for the marche communo It may be true, as claimed by a right-of--center
politician, that all but Communists, Hendesistes, and "ultras" are genuinely
pro-NATO and pro-European integration, But the Gaullist presence has raised
new doubts and created new hazards to the fulfillment of this trend insofar
as it requires sacrifices by France, other than those sacrifices aimed at
restoring "greatness," It remains to be seen whether the devaluation of the
franc and removal of certain import quotas in late 1958 means that France is
prepared to abandon significant elements of her traditional protectionist policies
In the absence of lucid statements of policy from the primary source,
de Gaulle's real attitudes are generally derived from political gossip or,
at best, deductions from rather slender evidence. The former asserts that
de Gaulle dislikes Monnet-.-"M, Europe"--and that Soustelle is opposed to the
8. Robert Schuman in "La Politique Extirieure," Forces Nouvelles, June 1956.,
9. Thomas J. Hamilton commented from Paris in July 1957 that "the majorities in
the French Assembly in favor of ratifying both the common market and the Euratom
treaties were larger than they would havo been but for the Sues crisis andthe attitude of the United Stetes and the United Nationso" New York Times,July 16, 1957.
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concept of European inter-ration. The latter suggests that French economic
impulses regarding meaningful European integration are really inconsistent
in fact and in promise with, for example, the liberal economic policies of the
Federal Republic of Germany. Pro-integration forces in Europe, in the Nether-
landsfor example, take heart--or half-heart--from the General's -apparent
willingness to leave economic and financial- policy matters to Antoine Pinay,.
who is "teachable." The devaluation of December 1958 was perhaps most signi-
ficant because it was done in cooperation with France' s European partners.
The cynical French journalist's interpretation of all French foreign
policies as determined by domestic political maneuverings is applied, mutatis
mutandis, to European policy. Most Frenchmen are basically "indifferent" to
this subject (except for "periodic moments of passion" as with E.D.C.). Euro-
pean policy has thus been "manipulated" by its opponents as a pretext to attack
the "hated" Pied Piper of the liberals and intellectuals, Pierre Mendes-France.
As Americans interpret the French national interest, nothing merits a
higher priority than some form of marriage with Germany within the context of
"The Six," and the rapid restoration of Europe's capacity to wield political,
economic, diplomatic, military, and cultural power through a new-found unity,
The French view, however, operates at a lower level of abstraction, where it
continues to suffer from traditional anti-Germanism, concern with Empire,
conventional economic doctrines and practices, and the nationalism for which
de Gaulle has been the catalytic reagent. The situation is full of irony. In
rejecting with hauteur the notion of utilizing international organization as
one of the possible means for cultivating the political strength needed to
enable France to play the great power role she desperately clings to, she
thus holds back from what .may be her only alternative to continued weakness
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and ultimate isolation, General de Gaulle believes that without a renewed
quality of pride in French policy, cooperation within the European framework
is impossiole. His choice of Germany's Adenauer over England's Macmillan in
the negotiations on the proposed Free Trade Zone in late 1958 proved to some
that the theory was sund and boded well for Europe as a whole, Bvt France's
gamble with history is plain when one perceives that the very quality of pride
with which she is to be rejuvenated may also be the barrier to accession to a
more durable role in the world0
Africa, Colonialism, nd Underdevelopment
In any discussion of the issues involving the UN and colonialism, relations
with the Asians and Africans, and the economic development of underdevoloped
countries, all roads lead to Algeria (just as for Belgium they lead to the Congo).
Perhaps this is one reason why so many otherwise intelligent French leaders
aitomatically equate anticolonialism with communism, The successes of anti-
colonialism's historical sweep have, in the eyes of many leading Frenchmen,
spelled a major communist victory. If Europe is completely "thrown out" of
Africa (ie., Algeria) it means "the end of the free worldt" A "few more Nassers"
and )ATO ip finishedo Inherent in the argument is the assertion that the whole
process was preventible, and here lies the most profound difference in interpre-
tation as between France and the United States, US policy toward Indonesia and
Egypt, asserts a senior Foreign Ministry official, opened the floodgates for
"communism" in both instances, Why, he bewailed, cannot the US emulate the
French and British, who "directed the world" in the 19th century?
In the Ministry of Overseas Territories there is greater acceptance of the
inevitability of independence for France's African territories, France is caught
between her territories and the UN, and the pressure to cease the transmission
of information to the UN for what have now become "autonomous" regions comes not
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from the metropole but from the "political leaders within the territories."
There is a clear recognition here that, whatever additional autonomy and
self-government may be accorded to the colonies, their ambitions will not
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be satisfied short of independence,, If the Gaullist referendum under which
France offered independence (and immediate severance of French economic rela-
tions) represented a new triumph for French colonial policy, it may still be
true, in Renan's ironic phrase, that "institutions are destroyed by their
triumphs,"
The process got out of hand at once when Guinea was elected to UN member-
ship at the close of the General Assembly session in 1958, before France could
implement its second thoughts about "complete" severance of ties, It was com=
pounded when Ghana and Guinea announced their putative merger while the latter
negotiations were still underway. Other territories which opted to remain in
the French union may have their own second thoughts. "Non-Frenchmen" are once
again endangering the development of what seems to France an entirdly rational
and even, to some, dangerously generous policy. A vigorously liberal French
publicist expressed his confident belief that the African blacks, unlike the
Arabs, are "practical" and "not in a hurry," Their emancipation may take "50
years," so the obvious procedure is for both sides to "cooperate" in the mean-
time. And a senior French Africa affairs specialist urges that in this process
France and Belgium might well cooperate in joint appraisals and even actions,
instead of continuing to function in "water-tight compartments" in Africa.
But the new UN Economic Commission for Africa arouses the profoundest mis-
givings, The same fonctionnaire fears the kind of "bureaucratic" international
intervention implicit in the new UN body, and predicts that local forces.-not
"France"--would resist such intrusion. The ECA will, he predicts, find Africa's
needs far greater than it had anticipated, with "everything demanding a priority,"
and with the recipients expecting the one thing the UN cannot supply: new
I -
VI-21
capital. France will go along out of a kind of motivation her friends might
well ponder. According to this official(one of France's ablest) the UN's
effort will do a number of salutary things. It will illuminate the problem
for the rest of the world. It will show that Western rule was not the cause
of economic and social underdevelopment. And it will show les sous-developpees
how they have benefitted from the free market. (Officials concerned with UN
affairs are more tolerant of the ECA's chances of success, but only if it re-
mains "technical" and entirely free of "political passions. ")
In the sister Ministry of France of France d'Outre Mer the approach is different.
France, it is agreed, will participate in the ECA, although without enthusiasm.
But Ministry officials have urged such participa tion on the Government on
"realistic" grounds: the UN and its agencies are "here to stay,1" and, moreover,
can be an "advantage" for France in her relations with Sub-Sahara Africa.
Other Frenchmen are, it is held, beginning to sense this, on the practical
ground that France simply cannot afford the investment of financial and human
resources needed in Africa over and above the even higher priorities reauired
with respect to metropolitan France and, of course, Algeria. France, in this
view, confronts the alternatives of help from the US, the UN, or "Europe." If
the UN will "help," France ought to agree readily to her particils tion. Even
Government circles are beginning to react against the defeatist sort of isola-
tionism found in, so-called "Cartierism, " which writes off Africa because France
must confine major capital investment to her own needs. Algeria must come before
Black Africa, but this cannot of course be admitted publicly to the latter.
French politicians rarely eypress the sort of balanced view just elaborated.
Some speak in terms of the classical mission civilisatrice, whether explicitly
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or not, when they continue to advocate a "joining of the races" in a
"CoMMonwealth," nevertheless governed by force, when necessary, as something
the Africans "understand well,"
Spokesmen of parties closer to the center and even slightly to the left
may agree that certain "forces" are at work in the underdeveloped countries
which cannot be ignored, and that France should not walk out of the UN. But
the conviction persists that nationalism, particularly in the Mediterranean
basin, "opens the door to communismo" (No one ever commented as to what doors
nationalism in France might open.) Even further to the left, furnishing one
of France's most fascinating political paradoxes, the possibilities of using
the UN as a "bridge" to the underdeveloped countries is often rejected on the
ground that "bridging the gap" is equivalent to "unconditional surrender,"
France, it is announced, will "never" leave Africa.
That French opinion regarding underdeveloped and anticolonial countries
is filtered through the prism of Algeria is quite evident and does not require
further elaboration here. For that matter, it is probably preferable to treat
the Algerian question not at all than to treat it inadequately French sensi
bilities have of course been newly shocked by the US abstention on a resolution
calling for negotiations leading toward independence, which barely failed to
pass in the closing days of the 1958 General Assembly. What can be said is that
despite the dementi of Quai d'Orsay officials, even in private, there exists an
obvious connection between France's agonizing entanglement in North Africa on
the one hand, and on the other the French vision of the UN as a possible agency
for economic development of underdeveloped territories (or indeed for any other
constructive purpose). Another point to be made here is that French justifica-
tions for retention of Algeria are tending more and more to emphasize its
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international nature, not in the sense which France rejects in the UN, but
in terms of the mutual needs of nEurope" and Africa, and in particular the
value of newly exploited Sahara oil resources for the"European and Atlantic
communities,," Finally, there is the growing realization, especially in senior
civil service ranks, that while "France must stay in Algeria"--an assertion
few French outside of extreme left-wing circles will debate--if reforms are
not quickly consummated elsewhere in Africa the moderates throughout French
Africa, including Algeria, will be irrevocably buried under extremist pres-
sures,, To a few, this leads once again to the possible uses of the UN in ad-
vancing such reforms, through technical and even financial assistance, But
even they see no possibility of a French initiative in this direction.
Noncommunist intellectuals have no solution to the dilemma of Algeria,
but perhaps because of this they tend to speak not of solutions but of what
will be necessary "after the war ends," What will be necessary, they say,will be a
rethinking of long-range French policy toward the Arab world and also the
rest of the formerly colonial regions to the south, Few signs exist that
these long-term issues will be faced up to until, one way or another, France's
travail in Algeria moves into a new and somehow less hopeless stage.
Conclusions
The great gulf which separates the French view of the UN from the
American view is illuminated by recent findings about US public attitudes
toward the world organization. In all US cities surveyed, conmunity leaders
were broadly in favor of the UN and its objectives. 0  The most frequent
criticisms of the UN were that it is, if anything, too weak, and considerable
support exists for increasing its power, 1 1  Soon after Suez and Hungary, 77%
10, The United States Public and the United Nations (New York: Csrnegic
Endowment, 195T 's P. h
1 Ibide,: p. 15,
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of those Americans interviewed felt that the UN was doing a good or fair job,
and 85% believed that it was very important to "try to make the UN a success." 1 2
Comparable figures for France1 3 show that important segments of French opinion
hold markedly different views.
Some bases for the negative and resentful French spirit toward the UN
and--with the possible exception of some of the Specialized Agencies-its
works, have been suggested in this brief paper. Algeria is a key factor. But
what Algeria really does is to concentrate in a single focus the whole complex
of issues on which France has fought a losing battle, whether political or
military, since World War II The UN is one of several major symbols of the
-receding French world position. In the French appraisal of the forces of
status guo and revolution in the former and transcolonial world, the UN-and
US policy as well--often fall into the category of hindrance rather than help0
Like the South Africans, the French have been moving toward the policy of stating
their case in the UN rather than walking out of the Assembly as they did in
1955 over the issue of Algeria0 But it still seems a minority position in
France which acknowledges profound changes in the African status quo, dis-
tinguishes Arab nationalism from communism, seeks through Europe or elsewhere
a higher form of world order and world law, and interprets the present day UN
as at least a potentially helpful agency vis-a.-vis the non-Western world,
specifically through economic, social, technical, and technological cooperation0
The present quest for national grandeur may succeed at the expense of relative
isolation from regional and global trends toward greater integration (and possibly
even at the expense of French security itself)."
12o Ibido, p. 9,
13. Yo6be published in a subsequent paper within this series.
14. According to a dispatch from the December 1958 NATO meeting in Paris,
"Responsible French editorialists stated bluntly that France would not
co-operate in the installation of missile bases here, permit the stock-
piling of nuclear weapons under U.S. control in France or integrate her
tactical air defense forces under NATO command until her political condi-
tions had been met 0 " Boston Herald, December 19, 1958.
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If the present apolitical interval in French history is succeeded by a
new alignment, if after de Gaulle the more characteristic terdencies of French
politics come to life once again, the presently submerged themes may well
reassert themselves as they become associated with power and the capacity to
act, It is doubtful that the General can entirely end the oscillation which
he prefers to describe as "swinging perpetually between drama and mediocrity.,"1
More than perhaps any other country of Western Europe, French policy and plan-
ning toward the external world faithfully mirror domestic attitudes and the
strategic and tactical interactions of French internal politics,
France may have enduring national interests, but historically these are
subject to profound reinterpretation in the light of changing domestic pres-
sures, It is this very quality, combining intransigeance with the capacity
for major political bouleversement, which enables Charles de Gaulle to try
to reassemble the French sense of identity, and which might enable a successor
regime to move in directions which the present, for the best and the worst of
reasons, chooses to leave to the future.
15, Quoted in New York Times, December 29, 1958,
